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ABSTRACT
Due to the convenience and unprecedented cost-effectiveness, more and more individuals and
organizations have utilized cloud storage servers to host their data. However, because of security
and privacy concerns, not all data can be outsourced without reservation. The concerns are rooted
from the users’ loss of data control from their hands to the cloud servers’ premise and the infeasibility
for them to fully trust the cloud servers. The cloud servers can be compromised by hackers, and
they themselves may not be fully trustable.
Though encryption helps to secure data, the server or the attacker who compromise the server is
still able to infer private information from the user’s access pattern. It is possible for an attacker to
use the access pattern information to reconstruct the data query and infer the plaintext of the data.
Hence, a large variety of schemes based on the oblivious RAM (ORAM) model have been proposed
to allow a user to access the exported data while preserving user’s data access pattern. Most of
these research has focused on the communication efficiency improvement, but the storage efficiency
has not received much attention. To host N data blocks, in general, the state-of-the-art ORAM
constructions need the storage server to also store cN with c > 3 or O(N · logN) dummy data
blocks, which represents a huge storage overhead when N is large. In addition to the inefficiency in
server storage, most of existing ORAM constructions incur O(logN) blocks or higher client-server
communication cost. Though some recent work has reduced the cost to O(1) blocks by employing
multiple non-colluding servers, the system could become vulnerable if some server does not follow
the protocol completely.
ix
To address the above limitations, we develop a series of new ORAM constructions, gradually
towards a more practical and secure solution that can obliviously protect the data access pattern for
users of cloud storage with more affordable storage, client-server communication, and server-server
communication overheads. Specifically, this dissertation presents:
• SE-ORAM, which reduces server storage overhead to zero, but at the same time, incurs a
client server communication cost of O(log2N) blocks;
• Octopus ORAM, which incurs 0.34N · B server storage overhead, and reduces client-server
communication cost to three blocks for query and about 1.5 logN blocks for eviction per
query;
• Three-server Octopus ORAM, an efficient and accountable multi-server ORAM, which incurs
0.3N ·B server storage overhead and reduces client-server communication cost to O(1) blocks,
at the expense of server-server communication cost at O(logN) blocks per query.
We have rigorously quantified and proved the security strengths of these constructions and demon-
strated their performance efficiency through detailed analysis.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
As cloud computing has been a common computing paradigm, cloud storage also become perva-
sive. In the cloud storage model, a public cloud storage provider owns and hosts a physical storage
that may span over multiple physical servers and locations; a client, which could be an organiza-
tion or individual, leases storage capacity to store data. Due to the convenience and unprecedent
cost-effectiveness, more and more individuals and organizations have utilized cloud storage servers
to host their data.
However, because of security and privacy concerns, not all data can be outsourced without
reservation. Data encryption has been common for data privacy protection, but it cannot protect
data access patterns for cloud storage clients. As in many cloud storage systems [12], data is
stored in the unit of block. Before outsourcing, each data block can be encrypted using some
probabilistic encryption method such as AES [8] with CBC encryption mode, to prevent the data
content from being exposed to the storage server. When the user needs to access the outsourced
data, she downloads and decrypts the data, accesses them, and re-encrypts them before uploading
them back. Encryption alone, however, is not sufficient. The server is still able to infer private
information from the user’s access pattern, for example, the sequences of accessed locations, the
orders of accessed locations on the server, etc. A curious owner or employee of a cloud storage
service, or an intruder invading the storage server, can observe a client’s data access pattern. As
shown in figure 1, the observed pattern and the client’s activities that could be obtained through
some side channels, the attacker could develop a model relating them. Later on, the attacker may
use the model and newly observed access patterns to infer or predict the client’s activities. As
illustrated by Islam et. al. [27], it is possible for an attacker to use the access ordering information
to construct the data query and infer the plaintext of the data.
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Therefore, exposed data access pattern can potentially reveal some private information about
cloud storage clients. Especially, military, homeland security and public safety agencies should
protect these private information from the enemies; businesses should protect the information from
their rivals and competitors.
Figure 1.1 Access Pattern Attack Model
Researchers have been exploring ways to protect users’ access patterns and various schemes have
been proposed in the literature. Among them, Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [19, 58, 59, 20, 44, 21, 22,
62, 28, 32, 13, 60, 49, 53, 16, 54, 40, 46, 56, 67, 57, 37, 41, 52, 42, 9, 38, 14, 63, 5, 11, 64, 51, 39, 47, 33]
and Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [1, 50, 43, 7, 2, 30, 17, 18, 25, 31, 6, 4, 55, 29, 15] are two
categories of security-provable methods. PIR schemes are applicable to the scenarios where data
are read only, while ORAM schemes are more flexible as they allow a user to perform both read
and write operations on the data. Hence, in this dissertation, we focus on improving the existing
ORAM schemes.
Intuitively, an ORAM system is considered secure if the server cannot learn anything about a
user’s data access pattern. The formal definition can be referred to Definition 2 in Chapter 2. In
recent years, interests in ORAM research have increased, and many ORAM constructions have been
proposed targeting at making ORAM practical. In general, ORAM performance can be measured
in terms of the communication cost between the user and the server, the storage costs at the server
and the user, and the computational costs at the server and the user.
Most of these research have focused on the communication efficiency improvement, but the
storage efficiency has not received much attention. The prioritization on communication efficiency
over server storage efficiency is based on that, the price for communication is much higher than
3
that for storage. This is true; taking the Amazon S3 service in North America as example, the
price for transferring data from Amazon to Internet is at least $0.05 per GB, while storing 1 GB
data for one month only costs $0.02. Nevertheless, we observe that, when the cloud server needs
to storage a large amount of data, the momentary cost for storage could be comparable to or even
exceed that for communication. For example, consider a client uses high-speed Internet to connect
with AWS S3, and the network bandwidth is 1 Gbps. Supposing the client keeps accessing data
from the server and the bandwidth is fully utilized for the accessing, the amount of data that can
be transferred from the server to the client is no more than 324 TB per month, which costs about
$16,200, roughly the cost for the client to store 800 TB data at the server. That is, as long as
the client has data with several hundreds of TB or more to store at the server, the monetary cost
for storage has been comparable to or even higher than the monetary cost for communication.
The weight of storage cost could be even higher in practice, because the client may not access the
outsourced data too frequently as frequently-accessed data could be cached locally. Hence, reducing
the storage overhead is also imperative.
To address the problem with client-server communication, some researchers introduce multiple
(at least one) non-colluding servers. For example, S3ORAM [26] uses at least three servers and
incurs O(B) bandwidth consumption for client-server communication, where B is the block size in
unit of bits, which is similar to the cost incurred by a non-oblivious storage system; it still requires
O(logN ·B) bandwidth consumption for communication between the servers, but the inter-server
communication occurs behind the scene and does not consume client-server bandwidth. This is
based on the assumption that the bandwidth between servers is more abundant than that between
client and server and the cost between servers is lower then between client and server. However,
there are serval limitations with these schemes. First, existing ORAM schemes require multiple
servers each storing a copy of the outsourced data blocks, which significantly increases the server
storage cost, for example, S3ORAM needs to store 12N blocks for everyN real data blocks exported.
Second, these schemes assume the servers to be semi-honest, which may not be realistic in practice; a
dishonest server could deviate from the designated protocol, and if not detected immediately, could
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lead to big overhead to recover the system. Hence, it is also important to build an accountable
multiple server ORAM scheme with server storage cost efficiency and client-server communication
efficiency.
In this dissertation, we aim to improve the server storage efficiency and at the same time improve
communication efficiency with the following approaches. We propose a series of three new ORAM
constructions to achieve better performance than state-of-the-art. In the following, we provide a
brief overview of the motivations, key design ideas, and performance of these constructions.
First, we propose SE-ORAM: A Storage-Efficient Oblivious RAM. As improving server storage
efficiency is one of the most important targets of our work, the first study aims to design an ORAM
construction with zero storage overhead at the server, while communication efficiency is similar or
higher than state-of-the-art.
We design an storage efficient ORAM (SE-ORAM) with three novel technologies: eviction
with non-uniform probabilities, On-demand Introduction of Dummies and Periodical Removal of
Dummies.
• With Eviction with Non-uniform Probabilities, during eviction, the next evicting node and
evicting blocks is decided based on the state of the current evicting node, i.e., a larger prob-
ability to evict data to its left child if more of its data blocks are evictable to left, and vice
versa. This way, the chance could be significantly reduced for the failure situation to occur.
• With On-demand Introduction of Dummies, a dummy block (evictable to both left and right)
is inserted on demand to replace a real data block, which is moved to the client’s cache. Note
that, the storage server still stores the same number of data blocks, though some of the blocks
become dummies.
• With Periodical Removal of Dummies, an extra query and eviction process is launched pe-
riodically to retrieve and discard a dummy from the server and evict a real data block from
the client to the server. As result, we can bound the number of dummy blocks on the server
as well as prevent the user side cache from overflowing.
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Extensive security proofs have been conducted to demonstrate the security of SE-ORAM. SE-
ORAM is secure with parameter λ, the probability is at most ( 1Nn )
1− 1
λ for the server to correctly
infer a sequence with n data accesses from any storage location access sequence. This is useful in
practice, particularly when a large number of data blocks are outsourced. In terms server storage
efficiency, SE-ORAM stores exactly N number of data blocks on server side, which has zero server
storage overhead. Note that, the server stores a small number of dummy blocks, and the real block
replaced by dummy block is stored in user side storage. The number of introduced dummy blocks
is no more than x logN with probability 1− 1
N2x
, as long as λ ≥ 2 and each node on the storage tree
can store 4 logN or more data blocks. SE-ORAM incurs communication cost of O(log2N ·B) where
B is block size in unit of bits, which is higher than some state-of-the-art ORAM constructions.
Second, we propose Octopus ORAM: A Storage Efficient 8-ary Tree ORAM. In SE-ORAM, we
reduced the server storage overhead to zero, but the client-server communication cost is O(log2N ·
B), which is higher than some of the state-of-the-art. We propose a new ORAM construction called
Octopus ORAM, aiming at reducing the client-server communication cost in the cost of introducing
a small amount of server storage overhead, which is much lower than existing ORAM constructions.
• With organizing the server storage as 8-ary tree instead of binary tree, we make the non-leaf
nodes to have much smaller storage than the leaf nodes.
• With deliberately making the size of each leaf node to be very large, this work requires only
a small fraction of redundant space to ensure a negligible probability of space overflow, hence
minimize the storage space of leaf nodes.
• With the newly designed data query algorithm makes the communication cost per query to be
a constant independently of either the node size or the height of the tree. Based on a carefully
selected value k (i.e., eight) that balances the tradeoff between storage and communication
efficiency, we design an eviction scheme that runs after a certain large number of queries to
evict a large batch of data blocks at once.
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Extensive security proofs have been conducted to prove Octopus ORAM is secure under our
security definition. In terms of performance, our proposed ORAM can significantly reduce the server
storage overhead to around 0.34N (i.e., the server only needs to allocate 1.34N blocks when the
client outsources N blocks) while maintaining a comparable level of communication cost: to server
a query, the online communication cost is 3 blocks and eviction (maintenance) communication cost
is no more than 1.5 logN blocks.
Third, we propose Three Servers Octopus ORAM: An efficient and Accountable k-ary Tree
Storage Efficient ORAM. Introducing multiple servers is a well-known approach to reduce client-
server communication cost. But in existing multi-server ORAM constructions, server storage is
organized exactly same or almost same, which also multiply the server storage cost. For example,
in S3ORAM [26], the t (t ≥ 3) servers’ storage are organized in same structure, the only difference
is each server stores a difference secret-shared part of a data block. As each server needs to store
4N data block, the overall server storage cost is tripled, i.e., the server storage cost of S3ORAM is
12N ·B.
To take the advantages of multi-server ORAM construction while at the same time keep the
server storage efficiency, we propose a new three server ORAM, which shares some ideas as Octopus
ORAM. S0 stores user-data blocks as well as small amount of dummy blocks, S0 is organized similar
to Octopus ORAM but the number of child nodes is configurable. S1 and S2 only temporarily store
a small number of blocks to facilitate the query and eviction processes.
• With S0 organized similar to Octopus ORAM, and S1 and S2 only store a small number
of blocks temporarily, we keep the server storage cost only a little bit higher than Octopus
ORAM, instead of triple the server storage size.
• With S1 and S2 facilitate the query and eviction, the client only needs to transfer target block
and some metadata between client and servers, which reduces client-server communication
cost.
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• With the authentication mechanism, the non-colluding servers can detect any malicious server,
while incurring small traffic between server and client, and requiring light server computa-
tional cost.
Extensive security proofs have been conducted to prove our work can protect clients’ access
pattern privacy. As for the cost, this work incurs low server storage overhead, which is around
0.3N blocks for every N real data blocks exported, the client-server communication cost is O(B)
bits per query by average, and server-server communication cost is O(logN ·B), lower communica-
tion costs than S3ORAM, the most related state-of-the-art scheme. By supporting accountability
with multiple servers, the work removes the less-realistic semi-honest assumption in a multi-server
oblivious storage system; Note that, our system has made full use of the available moderate level
of client-side storage, but the required storage capacity is still only as small as around 0.1% of the
cloud server’s storage capacity.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we first describe the ORAM system and threat model. Then, we give the formal
security definition of ORAM system. In Chapter 3, we review the state-of-the-art Oblivious RAM
schemes. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we present our proposed three schemes. In Chapter 7, we
conclude this dissertation with a summary of our main contributions and future research plans.
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CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a distributed system that consists of a client and one or multiple cloud servers.
The client has an on-premise cloud storage gateway with a moderate storage capacity, though it
still much smaller than the capacity of the cloud storage servers. The cloud servers are assumed
to be non-colluding, however, the servers could be malicious and some accountability mechanisms
will be deployed to each server to detect the misbehavior of other servers. The client is assumed
to be honest; note that, this assumption could be removed by, for example, requiring the client to
electronically sign each message and data block that it sends.
Assume the client outsources N data blocks each with the same size of B bits to the cloud
storage server, and then needs to access the outsourced data every now and then.
Each data access intended by the client, which should be kept private, is of two types:
• Read a data block D of unique ID i from the storage, denoted as (read, i,D);
• Write a data block D of unique ID i to the storage, denoted as (write, i,D).
To hide a private data access, the client and servers need to access multiple locations of the server-
side storage and exchange some messages with each other. Each location access or message exchange,
which can be observed by the servers, is one of the following types:
• Retrieve (i.e., read) a data block D from location l at the storage, denoted as (read, l,D);
• Upload (i.e., write) a data block D to location l at the storage, denoted as (write, l,D);
• Send a message from one party to another (note: a party could be the client or a server),
denoted as (send, s, d) where s and d are the source and destinations.
Extending the security definition of ORAM in prior works [19, 54, 53], we define the security of
our proposed oblivious storage system as follows.
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Definition Let λ be a security parameter, and ~x = 〈 (op1, i1, D1), (op2, i2, D2), · · · 〉 denote
a private sequence of the client’s data accesses, where each op is either a read or write. Let
A(~x) = 〈 (op′1, p1,1, p1,2), (op′2, p2,1, p2,2), · · · 〉 denote the sequence of the location accesses or
message exchanges (observed by the server) in order to accomplish the data access sequence ~x. An
oblivious storage system is secure if:
1. for any two equal-length private sequences ~x and ~y of data accesses, their corresponding
location access and message exchange sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are computationally indistin-
guishable; and
2. the system fails to operate with a probability of O(2−λ).
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) was first introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [19],
which enables users to export their data to a remote storage and access the remote data storage
without exposing the data access pattern. Since then, various ORAM constructions have been
proposed, including single-server ORAMs and multi-server ORAMs. In this chapter, we survey the
state-of-the-art of the ORAM research. Here, we use N to denote the total number of data blocks
outsourced by the user to the storage server and B to denote the data block size in bits.
3.1 Single-server ORAMs
According to the adopted data lookup techniques, single-server ORAMs have two major classes,
namely, hash-based ORAMs and index-based ORAMs.
In hash-based ORAMs [19, 58, 59, 20, 44, 21, 22, 62, 28, 32, 13, 60], the server-side storage
is usually organized as a hierarchy of layers and each layer is associated with a hash function to
locate each data block on this layer. The hash function is kept secret from the server. Data blocks
on each layer is distributed according to the hash function. During data query, the user requests
data blocks from the locations according to the hash functions. After obtaining the target data
block, the user re-encrypts and uploads the block back to the top layer on the server. To avoid
layer overflowing, when any layer is full, all data blocks on this layer will be obliviously shuffled
and dumped into the next larger layer.
As the first ORAM solution, Bucket Hash ORAM (BH-ORAM [19]) uses one normal hash
function for each of its logN layers. Thus, the server-side storage for each layer is a hash table
where each entry of the hash table is a bucket that can store up to logN data blocks to avoid
hash collision. When data blocks are shuffled to a specific layer, all buckets on this layer must
be fully occupied by adding additional dummy data blocks. Therefore, each data query retrieves
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all data blocks in one selected bucket from each non-empty layer. Bucket Hash ORAM incurs a
communication cost of O(log3N ·B) bits per query with constant user-side storage.
The efficiency of Bucket Hash ORAM has been improved by two follow-up proposals, namely,
Bloom Filter ORAM (BF-ORAM) by Williams et. al. [61] and Cuckoo Hash ORAM (CH-ORAM)
by Pinkas et. al. [44] and Goodrich et. al. [23, 21, 20, 22]. Bloom Filter ORAM uses one collision-
free Bloom Filter at each layer to replace the fixed-size hash bucket in Bucket Hash ORAM. Each
bit of the Bloom Filter is encrypted and exported to the server. Thus, each data query retrieves
and checks the Bloom Filter for the target data block and only one data block is retrieved from
each non-empty layer. Compared to Bucket Hash ORAM, the communication cost is reduced by
a factor of logN , which is O(log2N · B) bits per query. In Cuckoo Hash ORAM, a Cuckoo hash
function is utilized such that each layer is organized as a Cuckoo hash table. Due to Cuckoo hash
function, each data query only retrieves two data blocks from each layer. Thus, the communication
cost is reduced to O(log2N ·B) bits per query under constant user-side storage.
Furthermore, Kushilevitz et. al. [28] proposed a hybrid ORAM solution, called B-ORAM, to
balance the communication cost of data query and data shuffling. B-ORAM incurs O( log
2N
log logN ·B)
bits communication cost per query with constant user-side storage.
In index-based ORAMs [49, 53, 16, 54, 40, 46, 56, 67, 57, 37, 41, 52, 42, 9, 38, 14, 63, 5, 11, 64,
51, 39, 47, 33, 36, 34, 35], index is used to locate a user’s desired data on the remote server. Due to
the obliviousness requirement, index should be either stored at the user side or outsourced to the
storage server as an oblivious data structure (e.g. index can be recursively built up at the server
side similarly as that of data blocks).
The first index-based ORAM construction was proposed by Shi et. al. [49] with O(log3N · B)
bits per query, given a constant user-side storage. In that work, the server-side storage is organized
as a binary tree, where each node on the tree is a small bucket to hold up to logN data blocks. The
obliviousness of the scheme is accomplished through distributing each data block to a randomly-
selected path on the tree. A data eviction process is launched after every query to make the node
overflow probability small. The construction was later improved to Path ORAM [54] by reducing
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the size of each node and adding a stash at the user-side storage to deal with node overflowing. The
evaluation of Path ORAM shows that its per-query communication cost is O(logN · B) bits with
a stash size of O(logN · B) bits. According to the Path ORAM, numerous ORAM constructions
have been further proposed. For example, the construction proposed by Ren et. al. [47], makes
integrity checking available in Path ORAM.
Partition ORAM[53] organizes the server storage as
√
N partitions and each partition works as
an ORAM module. The client storage is utilized to contain a location map for blocks, a buffer for
storing and shuffling data blocks of an ORAM partition, and
√
N stash slots. Based on this storage
arrangement, together with optimizations in query and shuffling algorithm, the scheme incurs a
communication cost of about 1.25 logN blocks per query. GP-ORAM[67] generalizes Partition
ORAM by adapting the number of partitions to the available user-side storage and can outsource
the index table to the server to reduce local storage consumption. Burst ORAM[10] improves upon
Partition ORAM[53] by introducing a new XOR technique to reduce the online bandwidth cost
to a constant, and priority scheduling algorithms to deal with request bursts. Ring ORAM[45]
further improves the communication efficiency by combining the best qualities from the Partition
ORAM[53] and Path ORAM [54]. CURIOUS[3] presents a partition-based ORAM framework and
each partition is a small ORAM and can be organized as Path ORAM [54]. It doubles the overall
communication cost of Partition ORAM, but reduces the response time.
Path-PIR[37] introduces Private Information Retrieval (PIR) technology to improve communi-
cation efficiency of ORAM. In Path-PIR, the server-side storage is organized as a binary tree with
L = logN + 1 layers and each node can store logN blocks. A real data block is first encrypted
with symmetric encryption and then re-encrypted with homomorphic encryption before it is stored
to a position in the node. During query process, PIR technology is used to each node on the query
path, so for each node, the client only needs to retrieve one data block from server to save query
communication cost. During eviction, If node evicting node contains at least one real data block,
one such real block is selected and evicted to the child node which is on the path that the selected
block is mapped to; meanwhile, a dummy eviction to another child node is performed to hide the
13
actual pattern of eviction. The eviction is done using PIR-write and the client does not need to
retrieve blocks from server during eviction. Path PIR incurs communication cost of O(logN · B)
bits per query by average. KT-ORAM[64]] further improves Path-PIR by organizing the server
storage as a k-ary tree and re-designed the query and eviction processes. KT-ORAM reduces the
communication cost to O( logNlog logN ·B) when k = logN .
Onion ORAM[11] is the first ORAM construction that reduces communication cost to O(B)
bits. In Onion ORAM. client encrypts the blocks with homomorphic encryption algorithm and
stores them to server storage as a binary tree. To accommodate N real data blocks, the height of
tree is set as L + 1 layers and each node can store up to z data blocks (z is a system parameter
and N ≤ z · 2L − 1 ). Therefore, at least 4N data blocks (note: the 4N blocks include 3N empty
blocks; the size of each block has to be expanded due to being encrypted with some homomorphic
encryption algorithm) are stored on the tree. To query a data block, the client first read the index
table to find the position of the block, then constructs a PIR-read vector and issues a PIR-read to
retrieve the query target. After accesses the query target, client re-encrypts it and writes it back
to root node using PIR-write. For every A queries, client initiates an eviction process. During
eviction, all data blocks in source node (i.e., current eviction node) are merged to destination node
(i.e. the child node on the evicting path) using homomorphic add and copies all blocks from source
node to sibling node (i.e. the child node not on the evicting path). Overall, Onion ORAM incurs a
communication cost of O(B) bits and server-side storage overhead is O(N ·B) bits; but it requires
expensive server computational cost.
In Table 3.1, we compare several representative state-of-the-art single server ORAM construc-
tions.
3.2 Multi-server ORAMs
There are several multi-server ORAM schemes in literature. Among them, the first one is MS-
ORAM[32]. MS-ORAM extends the idea of the hierarchical ORAM[19] and the two non-colluding
servers are used to obliviously shuffle data. Following the hierarchical ORAM, the client-server
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Table 3.1 Comparisons of State-of-the-art Single Oblivious RAM Constructions. N de-
notes the total number of exported data blocks, B denotes the size of each data
block. Note that, for index-based ORAMs, we ignored the index table which
takes O(N ·logN) bits of client-side storage. Also we only consider non-recursive
version for the ORAM that supports recursive version.
ORAM Communication Cost Client Storage Cost Server Storage Cost
BH-ORAM [19] O(log3N ·B) O(B) O(N logN ·B)
CH-ORAM [44] O(log2N ·B) O(B) O(N ·B)
BF-ORAM [58] O(log2N log logN ·B) O(B) O(N ·B)
B-ORAM [28] O( log
2N
log logN ·B) O(B) O(N ·B)
T-ORAM [49] O(log3N ·B) O(B) O(N logN ·B)
G-ORAM [16] O( log
2N
log logN ·B) · ω(1) O(log
2N ·B) · ω(1) O(N ·B)
Path-PIR [37] O(log2N ·B) O(B) O(N logN ·B)
KT-ORAM [64] O( log
2N
log logN ·B) O(B) O(N logN ·B)
Path ORAM [54] 10 logN ·B O(logN ·B) · ω(1) 10N ·B
Burst ORAM [10] O(logN ·B) O(
√
N ·B) 4N ·B
Ring ORAM [45] 2.2 ∼ 3.7 logN ·B O(
√
N ·B) 6N ·B
CURIOUS [3] O(logN ·B) O(logN ·B) O(N ·B)
Partition ORAM [53] 1.25 logN ·B O(
√
N ·B) 4N ·B
GP-ORAM [67] ≈ 3 logN ·B O(
√
N ·B) < 5.3N ·B
Onion ORAM [11] O(B) O(B) 4N ·B
Table 3.2 Comparisons of State-of-the-art Multi-Server Oblivious RAM Constructions. N
denotes the total number of exported data blocks, B denotes the size of each
data block. Note that, for index-based ORAMs, we ignored the index table
which takes O(N · logN) bits of client-side storage.
ORAM C-S Comm. Cost Client Storage Cost Server Storage Cost S-S Comm. Cost
MS-ORAM [32] O(logN ·B) O(B) O(N ·B) O(log3N ·B)
MSS-ORAM [51] O(B) O(
√
N ·B) O(N ·B) O(logN ·B)
CNE-ORAM [39] O(B) O(B) 16N ·B -
TSKT-ORAM [65] O( logNlog logN ·B) O(N ·B) 24N ·B -
S3ORAM [26] 6B O(B) 12N ·B O(logN ·B)
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communication cost is O(logN · B), while the server-server communication cost is O(log3N · B)
due to its complicated shuffling process. Even though it only requires a constant local storage, the
communication cost is expensive in practice.
The second scheme is MSS-ORAM[51], which follows the basic design of Partition-ORAM[53].
In their scheme, data shuffling is done between different cloud servers. The client-server communica-
tion cost is reduced to a constant number, but the server-server communication cost is O(logN ·B).
In addition, it requires the client to store O(
√
N) data blocks in the local storage.
CNE-ORAM[39] incurs O(B) client-server communication cost using at least 4 non-colluding
servers. In CNE-ORAM, each data block is split into two parts using secret sharing techniques.
Each part of one data block is further copied into two copies and each copy is stored onto 2 out of
the 4 servers. The remaining part is also copied and stored onto the other 2 servers. At the server
side, the storage is organized as a binary tree with of height H = O(logN) and each tree node
can store θ data blocks. For each data query, the target data block is retrieved using XOR-based
private information retrieval. Then client then writes φ data blocks to root node of each server.
After χ queries, data eviction process is executed to prevent root node from overflowing. During
data eviction, the client guides the servers to merge nodes on the evicting path. In post eviction
process, client retrieves a block for the leaf node of the evicting path and replaces it with an empty
block if it is a noise block. The computation cost is mainly contributed by data XOR operations,
where for each data query, more than 0.5θ · L blocks are XORed and the communication cost is
mainly contributed by uploading φ data blocks to root per query, where L = O(logN) is the height
of the tree.
Based on KT-ORAM, TSKT-ORAM[65, 66] introduce two non-colluding servers to facilitate
bit-XOR read operation instead of expensive homomorphic encryption, thus reduce the server
computational cost. Eviction algorithm is re-designed, where evicting node is selected uniformly at
random for each layer, and the child nodes of eviction node is divided into three partitions logically
and it is only known to the user. The eviction process makes sure each position of the two partitions
of nodes receiving the evicted data blocks will be accessed with equal probability. TSKT-ORAM
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has a communication cost of O( logNlog logN ·B) when k = logN and the servers only need to conduct
simple XOR operation instead of expensive Homomorphic Encryption.
Hoang et al. propose S3ORAM [26] based on the utilization of multiple (at least three) non-
colluding servers. Server storage is organized as that in Onion ORAM[11], and each data block is
distributed to the three servers using Shamir Secret Sharing algorithm. During query, each server
returns a block which is the result of XOR of selected blocks, the client then rebuild the target block.
Eviction is conducted between server and client only need to send metadata to servers, thus no data
blocks is transferred during eviction. S3ORAM [26] incurs O(B) bandwidth consumption for client-
server communication, which is similar to the cost incurred by a non-oblivious storage system; it
still requires O(logN ·B) bandwidth consumption for communication between the servers, but the
inter-server communication occurs behind the scene and does not consume client-server bandwidth.
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CHAPTER 4. SE-ORAM
4.1 Research Goal and Rationales
This study [33] aims to design an single server ORAM construction with zero storage overhead
at the server.
The security goal of an ORAM construction is to prevent the storage server from correctly
inferring a client’s private data access sequence from the client’s storage location access sequence
that the server can observe. Existing ORAM constructions target at perfect security; that is, the
probability is at most 1Nn for the server to correctly infer a sequence with n data accesses from
any observed location access sequence, since Nn is the total number of sequences with n data
accesses. To attain this goal, the client’s query and shuffling operations should be fully random
and independent of each other.
Particularly, let us consider the tree-based ORAM [49]. When a data block is assigned to a path
of the storage tree, the path is selected uniformly at random to make the query process appear
fully random. During an eviction process, nodes are randomly selected to evict data, and each
selected node is dictated to evict a data block to its left or right child with the equal probability.
Due to the randomness, following undesired situation may happen: a node without any real data
block evictable to its left (or right) child is selected to evict data to left (or right). To deal with
such situation, dummy blocks are pre-introduced into the storage when the system is initialized;
and it has been shown that, O(N) or O(N logN) dummy blocks are needed to keep a low failure
probability, i.e., the probability that a node has already used up dummy blocks when it is in the
afore-described undesired situation.
To address the above issue without introducing storage overhead to the server, we design a new
eviction algorithm based on the following intuitions:
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• Eviction with Non-uniform Probabilities. When a node is selected to evict data to its children,
it can use different probabilities for different children; i.e., a larger probability to evict data
to its left child if more of its data blocks are evictable to left, and vice versa. This way, the
chance could be significantly reduced for the afore-mentioned undesired situation to occur.
• On-demand Introduction of Dummies. Nevertheless, the undesired situation could still occur.
To deal with it, a dummy block (evictable to both left and right) is inserted on demand to
replace a real data block, which is moved to the client’s cache. Note that, the storage server
still stores the same number of data blocks, though some of the blocks become dummies.
• Periodical Removal of Dummies. As the system keeps running, more dummy blocks are
inserted to the server and the client’s cache may overflow. To address this issue, an extra
query and eviction process is launched periodically to retrieve and discard a dummy from the
server and evict a real data block from the client to the server.
Due to the non-uniform eviction probabilities used in the eviction algorithm, perfect security is
not attained. To quantify the level of security that our new ORAM construction can achieve, we
propose a more generic security definition, which quantify security level by a parameter λ: if an
ORAM construction is secure with parameter λ, the probability is at most ( 1Nn )
1− 1
λ for the server to
correctly infer a sequence with n data accesses from any storage location access sequence. That is,
the advantage for the server to discover a client’s access pattern is upper-bounded by ( 1Nn )
1− 1
λ− 1Nn ,
which decreases as λ increases. We argue that, this notion of security can be useful in practice,
particularly when a large number of data blocks are outsourced and/or protecting relatively long
access patterns (i.e., n is large) is the major security goal. For example, when N = 240 and n = 10
(or N = 210 and n = 40), and λ = 2, the server’s advantage is upper-bounded by 2−200, which may
be considered “negligibly small” in practice. Besides, the definition allows a client of our ORAM




Based on the new eviction algorithm and the new definition of security, we formalize a generic
SE-ORAM construction with parameter λ. Through rigorous security and cost analysis, we show
that the construction is secure under the definition, and the number of introduced dummy blocks is
no more than x logN with probability 1− 1
N2x
, as long as λ ≥ 2 and each node on the storage tree
can store 4 logN or more data blocks. We also instantiate a SE-ORAM construction by setting
λ = 2, analyze its performance, and compare it with the state-of-the-art ORAM constructions. To
summarize, this study makes the following contributions:
• We introduce a generic security definition for ORAM constructions. It allows a client to
configure a desired security level and manage the tradeoffs between security and performance.
• We propose SE-ORAM, a generic storage-efficient ORAM construction with configurable
security parameter λ. Rigorous analysis shows that, SE-ORAM achieves the configured level
of security, introduces zero storage overhead to the storage server (i.e., the storage server only
storages N data blocks), and incurs O(logN) blocks storage overhead at the client, as long
as λ ≥ 2 and each node on the storage tree stores 4 logN or more data blocks.
4.1.2 Organization
In the rest of the chapter, Section 4.2 presents the security definition. Section 4.3 presents
the basic design of SE-ORAM, which is followed by security analysis in Section 4.4 and overhead
analysis and comparison in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Security Definition
Follow the research goal discussed in 4.1, we redefine the security of a single server ORAM for
this chapter.
Let λ > 1 be a security parameter. A client exports N equal-size data blocks to a remote storage
server. Each data access from the client, which should be kept private, is one of the following two
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types: (i) read a data block D of unique ID i from the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (read, i,D); (ii)
write a data block D of unique ID i to the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write, i,D). To accomplish
each data access, the client needs to access some storage location(s) at the remote storage server.
Each location access, which can be observed by the server, is one of the following types: (i) retrieve
(i.e., read) a data block D from a location l, denoted as a 3-tuple (read, l,D); (ii) upload (i.e.,
write) a data block D to a location l, denoted as a 3-tuple (write, l,D).
We assume the remote storage server is honest but curious; that is, it stores data and serves the
client’s location access requests honestly, but it may attempt to figure out the client’s data access
pattern hidden behind the location accesses. The network connection between the client and the
server is assumed to be secure; in practice, this can be achieved using well-known techniques such
as SSL [24].
We define the security of our proposed SE-ORAM(λ, N), which has security parameter λ and
stores N real data blocks, as follows.
Definition In SE-ORAM(λ, N), let ~xn = 〈 (op1, i1, D1), (op2, i2, D2), · · · , (opn, in, Dn) 〉 denote
a private sequence of the client’s n data accesses, where each opi is either a read or write operation;
let random variable A(~xn) denote the sequence of location accesses (observable by the server) that
the client uses to accomplish data access sequence ~xn. Note that, there may exist multiple location
access sequences that can accomplish ~xn, each with certain probability to be used by the client as
A(~xn); hence, A(~xn) is a random variable.
Let Xn denote the set of all possible sequences of the client’s n data accesses, and An the set of
all location access sequences that can accomplish at least one data access sequence in Xn.
Let Pr[~Tn| ~An], where ~An ∈ An and ~Tn ∈ Xn, denote the conditional probability of A(~Tn) = ~An
given that ~An has been observed by the server.












Note that, if the client’s data access pattern is perfectly protected, Pr[~Tn| ~An] = 1Nn ; i.e., no
matter what location access sequence (that can accomplish a certain sequence with n data accesses)
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has been observed, it is impossible for the server to infer the client’s actual data access sequence
hidden behind this observed pattern, because each of the Nn data access sequences has the same




Generally speaking, if an SE-ORAM(λ, N) is secure, the advantage for the server to infer the
client’s actual data access sequence ~Tn from a location access sequence ~An that has been observed,




λ − 1Nn ; the larger is λ, the smaller is the bound.
Hence, parameter λ quantifies the level of security that an SE-ORAM construction can attain.
4.3 The SE-ORAM Construction
This section elaborates the SE-ORAM construction in terms of storage organization, data query
and data eviction algorithms.
4.3.1 Storage Organization and Initialization
4.3.1.1 Server-side Storage
In the server, the storage is initially organized as a complete binary tree. Each node on the tree
can store up to s data blocks, where s is a system parameter and an even number. To simplify
presentation, we denote the height of tree as h and assume the total number of data blocks N as
N = s ·
∑h
l=0 2
l = s(2h+1 − 1). Hence, the number of level-h nodes is 2h, which also is N/s+12 ≈
N
2s .
The content of each data block Bi is encrypted probabilistically with a symmetric cipher (e.g.,
AES) before the blocks are randomly distributed to the nodes on the tree. Specifically, denoting
the plain-text content of a block Bi as Di, we have Bi = E(r|Di), where r is a nonce and E is a
symmetric encryption function.
In each node n, data blocks are randomly divided into two equal-size groups, called left group
and right group and denoted as GL(n) and GR(n). Each block in the left group randomly picks a
level-h node n′ from the left branch of n, and the block is restricted to be evictable toward node
n′ only; hence, we call the ID of node n′ as the path ID of the data block. Similarly, each block in
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the right group also randomly selects a level-h node from the right branch of n, whose ID becomes
the block’s path ID.
As the data query and eviction processes go on, the tree may become incomplete and some nodes
may become non-full (i.e., containing less than s data blocks). Figure 4.1(a) shows an example of
the server-side storage. Here, h = 3, two of the level-h nodes (i.e., n3,1 and n3,6) are absent, and
one level-h node (i.e., n3,2) is non-full. Also, the data blocks with path IDs of n3,0, n3,4 and n3,7
cannot be completely contained in nodes between level 0 to level 3; hence, supplementary nodes
have been introduced to provide additional storage, e.g., n4,0 for n3,0, n4,4 and n5,4 for n3,4, and
n4,7 for n3,7.
4.3.1.2 Client-side Storage
The client-side storage includes three parts: (i) an index table I maintaining the mapping
between data block IDs and their path IDs (therefore it has N entries and each entry has h bits);
(ii) a data block cache C used to cache data blocks; and (iii) a small secret storage storing the key
for symmetric data encryption.
4.3.2 Data Query
When the client queries a data block of ID t (denoted as Bt), it first checks whether Bt is in
C; if so, the block is accessed and retained in C. Otherwise, the client looks up the index table I
to obtain Bt’s path ID (i.e., the ID of a level-h node, denoted as n
h
t hereafter). Then, the client
follows the steps below to obliviously retrieve Bt.
The client requests the server to return data blocks on the path from the root to the nht . In
response, the server first finds out all the nodes that should be returned to the client, based on the
current topology of the tree: (i) Case I - if node nht is currently on the tree and has no supplementary
nodes, all the nodes along the path from the root to nht should be returned. (ii) Case II - if n
h
t
is currently on the tree and has supplementary nodes, all the nodes along the path from the root
to nht as well as all of n
h















































Figure 4.1 Query Examples. In (a), query target Bt is at node n2,2 and has path ID n3,4.
Node n3,4 exists on the tree and has two supplementary nodes. The client
requests the server to retrieve nodes from the root to n5,4 which is the further
supplementary node of n3,4. Then, BL obliviously replaces Bt; finally, as node
n5,4 becomes empty after BL has moved, the node is removed from the tree. In
(b), query target Bt is at node n1,0 and has path ID n3,1. Node n3,1 does not
exist on the tree. The client requests the server to retrieve nodes on the path
from the root to n4,0, which is the longest path that has the largest overlap
with the path from the root to n3,1. Then, the client obliviously replaces Bt
with BL.
absent, the server acts as follows. Let nh0t denote the node that is on the path from the root toward
nht (as if n
h
t were still there) and the furthest away from the root. Let n
h1
t denote the leaf node of
the longest branch within the subtree rooted at nh0t . Note that, the path from the root to n
h1
t is
the longest path that has the largest overlap with the path from the root to nht (as if n
h
t were still
there). All the nodes along the path from the root to nh1t should be returned. Let us denote the
nodes that should be returned as n0t , n
1
t , · · · , nLt , where n0t is the root and nLt is the leaf node.
Among them, suppose node nyt on layer y contains Bt.
The server returns only the blocks in nLt in the first round. If Bt is among the blocks, the client
keeps Bt locally, re-encrypts the rest of the blocks and uploads them back to the server; otherwise,
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one arbitrary block denoted as BL is picked from the returned blocks, and the rest of the blocks
are re-encrypted and uploaded back to the server.
Next, the server returns all the blocks in nL−1t . If Bt is among the blocks, the block is kept
locally, and the rest of the blocks in nL−1t together with BL are re-encrypted and uploaded back
to the server. Otherwise, all the blocks in nL−1t are re-encrypted and uploaded to the server.
This process continues until all the blocks on the selected path have been returned to the client,
re-encryption and finally uploaded back to the server. Figure 4.1 shows two examples of data query.
4.3.3 Data Eviction
Data eviction should be conducted following the query process, to store the query target Bt
back to the server obliviously.
A path (i.e., a level-h node) is selected uniformly at random for Bt, and then all the data
blocks on the path are retrieved node-by-node. The eviction process should place Bt into a node
on the selected path before the blocks are all re-encrypted and uploaded back to the server. The
ID of the path becomes the new path ID of Bt and hence should be recorded in the client’s index
table I. During the course of eviction, some other blocks may be moved; the movement should
ensure that, a data block stays in a node on the path specified by its path ID or it stays in the local
cache maintained by the client. The eviction steps are elaborated in the following, and an example
containing evictions in four layers of the storage tree is given in Figure 4.2.
E1: Initial Step. Let Be denote the current block to evict (called the evicted block), and ne
the current node (called the evicting node) to accommodate Be’s eviction. Initially, Be = Bt and
ne = root. All the data blocks in ne are sent from the server to the client.
E2: Conditional Termination. If ne is non-full, the client writes Be into ne. Then, Be is
put into the left or right group of ne (i.e., GL(ne) or GR(ne)) according to its path ID; note that,
if Be is a dummy, it is randomly put into either GL(ne) or GR(ne).
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Figure 4.2 Data eviction example. (a) Evicting data block from layer 0 to 1: Evicted
block Be has path ID n3,7 but the evicting node n0,0 chooses to evict to left.
Hence, Be is written obliviously to n0,0, while a block with path ID n3,0 (and
therefore evictable to left) is selected from n0,0 to the new evicted block. This
is Case II in Section 4.3 E4. (b) Evicting data block from layer 1 to 2: Evicting
node n1,0 chooses to evict to right. No block (including Be and the blocks
in n1,0) is evictable to right. Hence, a dummy block is created to replace a
randomly-selected real block in n1,0, which is moved to the cache of the client.
The dummy block then becomes the new evicted block. This is Case IV in
Section 4.3 E4. (c) Evicting data blocks from layer 2 to 3: As the evicted block
Be is a dummy, it remains as the evicted block no matter whether the evicting
node chooses to evict to left or right. This is Case I in Section 4.3 E4. (d)
Evicting data blocks from layer 3 to 4: The evicting node is non-full. So the
evicted block is written to it obliviously and the eviction process terminates,
as explained in Section 4.3 E4.
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Another condition for the process to terminate is when ne is a level-h node. Be should be
written to the furthest supplementary node of ne. If the supplementary node is full, an additional
supplementary node is created to contain Be.
For both cases, blocks in ne (and its supplementary nodes if applicable) should be re-encrypted
and uploaded back to the server.
E3: Selection of the Next Evicting Node. Depending on the sizes of GL(ne) and GR(ne),
the selection of the next evicting node (denoted as n′e) works as follows:
If |GL(ne)| > |GR(ne)|, the left child of ne is selected as n′e with probability 1 − p while the
right child is selected as n′e with probability p, where p =
1
21/λ+1
and 1− p = 21/λ
21/λ+1
.
If |GL(ne)| = |GR(ne)|, the left and right children of ne have the same probability 0.5 to be
selected as n′e.
If |GL(ne)| < |GR(ne)|, the left child of ne is selected to be n′e with probability p while the right
child is selected to be n′e with probability 1− p.
Note that, if n′e does not exist on the tree, it should be created: 1) If ne is a level-h node or
a supplementary node, a supplementary node n′e is created and linked to ne; 2) otherwise, n
′
e is
created as a left or right child node of ne accordingly.
E4: Selection of the Next Evicted Block. There are a few different cases. Case I - If
Be is a dummy block, it remains to be the next evicted block denoted as B
′
e. Case II - If Be is a
real data block, and there is at least one block in ne ∪ {Be} (we also use ne to denote the set of all
data blocks in ne, for simplicity) that is evictable to n
′
e, one such block is selected to be B
′
e and the
selected block is replaced by Be. Case III - If Be is a real data block, no data blocks in ne ∪ {Be}
are evictable to n′e, but ne contains dummy blocks, one dummy block is selected as B
′
e and the
selected block is replaced by Be. Case IV - If Be is a real data block, no data blocks in ne ∪ {Be}
are evictable to n′e, and ne does not contain any dummy blocks, a new dummy block is created to
be B′e, while the original Be is saved to the client’s local cache. Finally, all current blocks in ne are
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re-encrypted and uploaded back to the server; then, after Be ← B′e and ne ← n′e are performed,
the process continues to Step E2.
4.3.4 Extra Query-Eviction Round
With the above eviction algorithm, the dummy blocks at the storage server and the cached
blocks at the client may keep increasing as more data blocks are queried. To bound the number
of these blocks and hence the storage overhead, we propose to periodically remove dummy blocks
and dump cached data blocks as follows.
Every time after an eviction process is completed, with probability ρ, the following extra round
of query and eviction is conducted: The client randomly selects a path. Depending on the selected
path, this step proceeds with one of the following two cases. Case I - the selected path contains
dummy blocks. In this case, one dummy block is retrieved from the selected path following the
above data query algorithm. Then, one real data block is randomly picked from the client’s cache,
and evicted to the tree structure at the storage server following the above data eviction algorithm.
Case II - the selected path does not contain any dummy blocks. In this case, one data block is
randomly retrieved from the selected path following the above data query algorithm, and then
evicted following the above data eviction algorithm.
4.4 Security Analysis
Recall that Section 4.2 defines the concepts of data access sequence and location access sequence,
and introduces the notations of Xn, An, random variable A(~xn) for ~xn ∈ Xn, and conditional
probability Pr[~Tn| ~An] for ~Tn ∈ Xn and ~An ∈ An. To facilitate the security analysis in this section,
we further introduce the following notations:
For any ~An ∈ An, we expand it to ~An = q1, e1, · · · , qn, en. Here, for each i = 1, · · · , n, qi
denotes the path accessed during the i-th query process and ei denotes the path accessed during
the i-th eviction process.
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Each ei in the above is further expanded to ei = ei,1, ei,2, · · · , ei,hi . Here, ei,j ∈ {0, 1} for
j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , hi}. ei,1 represents whether the root node (i.e., the first evicting node in the i-th
eviction process) evicts data to its left (if ei,1 = 0) or right child (if ei,1 = 1), and ei,j represents
whether the (j − 1)-th evicting node evicts data to its left (if ei,j = 0) or right child (if ei,j = 1).
Let Pr[~xn], where ~xn ∈ Xn, denote the probability that ~xn is the client’s actual data access
sequence.
Let Pr[ ~An|~xn], where ~An ∈ An and ~xn ∈ Xn, denote the conditional probability of A(~xn) = ~An
given that ~xn is the client’s actual data access sequence.
Let Pr[qi|~xn; q1, e1, · · · , qi−1, ei−1] denote the conditional probability of qi being selected to
access during the i-th query process given that the client’s actual data access sequence is ~xn and
the location access sequence has been q1, e1, · · · , qi−1, ei−1 before the i-th query is processed.
Let Pr[ei,j |~xn; q1, e1, · · · , qi, ei,1, · · · , ei,j−1] denote the conditional probability for the i-th evict-
ing node to evict to left (if ei,j is 0) or right (if ei,j is 1), given that the client’s actual data access
sequence is ~xn and the location access sequence has been q1, e1, · · · , qi, ei,1, · · · , ei,j−1 before this
evicting node is accessed.
Lemma 1. In SE-ORAM(λ, N), for ∀ ~xn ∈ Xn and ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n},




Proof. Initially and after being queried, data blocks are all distributed to the paths uniformly at
random. Hence, every path has the same probability to be selected for each query. The probability
is 2sN as the total number of paths is
N
2s .
Lemma 2. In SE-ORAM(λ, N), for ∀~xn ∈ Xn, ∀i ∈ {1,2,· · · ,n} and ∀j ∈ {1,2,· · · ,hi}: p ≤
Pr[ei,j | ~xn; q1, e1, · · · , qi−1, ei,1, · · · , ei,j−1] ≤ 1− p.
Proof. During an eviction process, the probability for an evicting node to evict a data block to its
left (or right) child is between p and 1− p. The lemma is therefore proved.
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Theorem 1. SE-ORAM(λ, N) is secure under Definition 4.2. That is, for any ~An ∈ An and
~Tn ∈ Xn, ( 1
Nn
)1+ 1











we need to compute Pr[~Tn], Pr[ ~An|~Tn], Pr[~xn] and Pr[ ~An|~xn].
First, as the server has no a prior knowledge of the client’s actual data access pattern, for ~Tn
and any ~xn ∈ Xn, it holds that




Second, due to Lemmas 1 and 2 and Pr[ ~An|~xn] being equal to
∏n
















i=1 hi . (4.5)
Hence, ( p
1− p



























As p = 1
21/λ+1
, Equation (4.8) becomes Equation (4.2), which completes the proof.
4.5 Cost Analysis
4.5.1 Storage Overhead
In SE-ORAM, the storage server initially stores only real data blocks exported by the client. As
the system keeps running, dummy blocks are introduced or removed, and the server needs to store
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some dummy blocks. However, when a dummy block is introduced, it always replaces a real data
block which should be moved to the client’s cache; when a dummy block is removed, it is always
replaced with a real data block previously cached by the client. Hence, the storage consumption
at the server keeps unchanged. In this sense, there is no storage overhead at the server. However,
extra storage overhead has been introduced to the client, who needs to cache real data blocks that
have been replaced by dummies.
In the following, we analyze the number of dummy blocks in the storage, which is equal to the
number of real data blocks that should be cached by the client. We first introduce the notation
of node state and its transitions. Then, we analyze the probability to introduce a new dummy
block during every data eviction process. Finally, we show that, with appropriate setting of system
parameters (i.e., λ ≥ 2 and s = 2cλ logN for c ≥ 1), the number of dummy data blocks is bounded
by x logN with a probability greater than 1− ( 1N )
2x.
According to the eviction algorithm in SE-ORAM, a new dummy block may be introduced only
when a data block is evicted from a node that is full and does not contain any dummy block. For
any of such node, we use (x, s− x) to represent its state, where x is the number of data blocks in
the left group and s− x is the number of data blocks in the right group. Thus, the state transition
probabilities are as follows:
Pr[(x+ 1, s− x− 1)|(x, s− x)] = (4.9)
1−p
2 , if x < s− x,
1
4 , if x = s− x,
p
2 , if x > s− x,
Pr[(x− 1, s− x+ 1)|(x, s− x)] = (4.10)
p
2 , if x < s− x,
1
4 , if x = s− x,
1−p
2 , if x > s− x.
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Pr[(x− 1, s− x+ 1)|(x, s− x)] can be computed similarly. Figure 4.3 shows the complete set












































Figure 4.3 Node State and Transition
Lemma 3. In SE-ORAM, any node on the storage tree has a probability less than 2−
s
2λ to stay in
state (0, s) (or state (s, 0)); that is, Pr[(0, s)] = Pr[(s, 0)] < 2−
s
2λ .
Proof. In the Markov chain of node state transition shown in Figure 4.3, the steady state distribu-















= Pr[(0, s)] · 2
s−2
2λ .
Also because λ > 1, it follows that Pr[(0, s)] < 2−
s−2
2λ · 12 < 2
− s
2λ . Similarly, it can be proved that
Pr[(s, 0)] < 2−
s
2λ .
Lemma 4. In SE-ORAM, when s = 2cλ logN , the probability for an eviction process to introduce
a new dummy block is less than logN2Nc .
Proof. According to Lemma 3, for any node, Pr[(0, s)] = Pr[(s, 0)] < 2−
s
2λ , which is less than 1Nc
since s = 2cλ logN .
During an eviction process, at most one dummy data block may be introduced. And the
introduction occurs only if: there is at least one evicting node that is in state (0, s) (or (s, 0)),
block evicted to this node is evictable only to right (or left), and the node chooses to evict to left
(or right). For this to occur, the probability is at most
1−
(





which is less than 1 − (1 − 12Nc )
logN since p = 1
1+21/λ
< 12 and h + 1 = log(N/s) + 1 < logN .
Expanding it, we obtain


































2i+1 for every i. Hence, the Lemma is
proved.
Theorem 2. In SE-ORAM, when ρ ≥ 12 and s = 2cλ logN for c ≥ 1,
Pr[number of dummy blocks ≤ x]
> 1− ( 1
2cλN c−1













Figure 4.4 State Transition of Dummy Block Number Nd
Proof. Let Nd denote the number of dummy blocks in the storage server when an eviction process
just finishes. Figure 4.4 depicts the Markov Chain of the transition of Nd value.
The transition from Nd = x to Nd = x + 1 occurs after one eviction process iff: during the
eviction process and the immediately-preceding query process, (i) a new dummy block is introduced,
and (ii) no dummy block is removed. The probability that (i) occurs is at most logN2Nc . Hence,
px,x+1 = Pr[Nd = x+ 1|Nd = x] ≤ logN2Nc .
The transition from Nd = x+1 to Nd = x occurs after an eviction process iff: during the eviction
process and the immediately-preceding query process, (i) no new dummy block is introduced, and
(ii) an existing dummy block is removed. The probability for (i) to occur is at least 1 − logN2Nc .




1+ρ is the probability that this query-eviction
round is an extra round, and 2sN is the low bound of the probability that a path containing dummy




logN ≤ N2 for every N ≥ 4; we do not consider N < 4 as it is trivial. Hence, px+1,x = Pr[Nd =
x|Nd = x+ 1] ≥ 3sρ2(1+ρ)N .
Since s = 2cλ logN for c ≥ 1, and ρ ≥ 12 and thus (1+ρ)/ρ ≤ 3,
px,x+1
px+1,x
< 2(1+ρ)N logN6sρNc ≤
1
2cλNc−1 .
So, Pr[Nd > x] < (
1
2cλNc−1 )
x ≤ ( 12λ)
x; that is, Pr[Nd ≤ x] > 1− ( 12cλNc−1 )
x ≥ 1− ( 12λ)
x.
As the number of data blocks cached by the client is the same as the number of dummy blocks
stored at the server side, we have the following corollary based on Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. In SE-ORAM, when ρ ≥ 12 and s = 4 logN , the number of data blocks cached at the
client side is bounded by x logN with a probability of 1− ( 1N )
2x.
4.5.2 Communication Overhead
Each query or eviction process needs to access a series of nodes along a path from the root to
a leaf. The communication and computational costs for query and eviction are therefore affected
by the height of the storage tree.
Theorem 3. In SE-ORAM, the height of the storage tree is upper-bounded by log(N/s) + 3 with a
probability of at least 1− (12)
s. When s = 2cλ logN , the probability is 1− ( 1N )
2cλ.
Proof. In SE-ORAM, N data blocks are distributed to N2s paths uniformly at random. We first
show that probability for a path to be assigned with more than 4s blocks is no greater than 1
N4c
.
Assigning N blocks to N2s is a standard balls in bins game with N balls and
N
2s bins. The expected
number of blocks assigned to each path is 2s. According to Chernoff bound, the probability for
any path to be assigned with more than 4s blocks is upper-bounded by e−2s/3 ≤ 2−s. That is, the
probability is at least 1− (12)
s that every path is assigned with no more than 4s block.
A path has the longest length if all the blocks assigned to it have to be stored in its level-h node
and supplementary nodes. In this extreme case, a path has a length of no longer than log(N/s) + 3
if no more than 4s blocks are assigned to it.
So far, we have proved that the probability is at least 1− (12)
s that the height of the tree is no
larger than log(N/s) + 3. When s = 2cλ logN , obviously the probability is 1− ( 1N )
2cλ.
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For each query, all blocks on a path containing the target data block need to be downloaded
and then uploaded; and in the following eviction process, all the data blocks on a randomly-selected
path need to be downloaded and then uploaded. The number of nodes on each root-to-leaf path
is O(logN) and each node stores O(logN) data blocks. Hence, the communication overhead is
O(log2N) data blocks per query.
4.5.3 Performance Comparison
We instantiate the generic SE-ORAM by setting λ = 2, c = 1 and thus s = 4 logN , and
compare the instantiated SE-ORAM with several state-of-the-art ORAMs including T-ORAM [49],
G-ORAM [16], Path ORAM [54] and P-PIR [37], in terms of storage and communication overheads.
Table 4.1 Storage and Communication Overheads. N : number of data blocks; B: block
size in bits. Server storage overhead is defined as the server’s storage consump-
tion other than the NB bits for the real data blocks. Client storage overhead








T-ORAM [49] O(B) O(N logN ·B) (log2N ·B)
G-ORAM [16] O(log2N ·B) O(N ·B) ( log
2N
log logN ·B)
Path ORAM [54] O(logN ·B) O(N ·B) O(logN ·B)
P-PIR [37] O(B) O(N logN ·B) O(logN ·B)
SE-ORAM O(logN ·B) 0 O(log2N ·B)
Table 4.1 compares SE-ORAM with state-of-the-art ORAM constructions in terms of the client
and server storage overheads as well as the communication overhead per query. As we can see,
SE-ORAM does not consume any extra storage in the server other than N · B bits for the N
data blocks. On the contrary, the server storage overhead of each of the state-of-the-art ORAM
constructions is O(N · B) or (N logN · B) bits. Though the communication cost of SE-ORAM is
on the same level as T-ORAM, as discussed in Section 1, it can be reduced to O(logN · B) by
adopting the additive Homomorphic encryption-based PIR primitives [37], similar to the way that
P-PIR reduced the communication cost of T-ORAM from O(log2N ·B) to O(logN ·B).
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce a generic security definition for ORAM constructions, which
allows a client to configure a desired security level and manage the tradeoffs between security and
performance. We also propose SE-ORAM, a generic storage-efficient ORAM construction with
configurable security parameter λ. The results of extensive analysis show that, SE-ORAM achieves
the configured level of security, introduces zero storage overhead to the storage server (i.e., the
storage server only storages N data blocks), and incurs O(logN) blocks storage overhead at the
client, as long as λ ≥ 2 and each node on the storage tree stores 4 logN or more data blocks.
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CHAPTER 5. OCTOPUS ORAM
5.1 Research Goal and Contributions
In chapter 4, we proposed SE-ORAM [33], which reduces the server side storage overhead to
zero, but the limitation is that the client-server communication cost is O(log2N ·B), which is higher
than some state-of-the-art. In this chapter, we aim at reduce the client-server communication cost,
while keeping the server storage overhead to be low.
We propose a new ORAM scheme [34], to accomplish the efficiency in both communication
and server-side storage. More specifically, our proposed ORAM can significantly reduce the server
storage overhead to around 0.34N (i.e., the server only needs to allocate 1.34N blocks when the
client outsources N blocks) while maintaining a comparable level of communication cost: to server
a query, the online communication cost is 3 blocks and eviction (maintenance) communication cost
is no more than 1.5 logN blocks.
In the following, Section 5.2 defines the problem. Section 5.3 describes our proposed ORAM,
which is followed by the security analysis in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 reports the performance
comparisons with Partition ORAM. Finally, Section 5.6 summarises the chapter.
5.2 Problem Definition
Following the prior research on ORAM constructions, we also assume the server to be semi-
honest (or honest but curious); that is, it stores data and serves the client’s requests according to
the protocol that we deploy, but it may attempt to figure out the client’s access pattern.
Assume the client outsources N equal-size data blocks to the cloud storage server, and then
needs to access the outsourced data every now and then. Each data access intended by the client,
which should be kept private, is one of the following two types:
37
• Read a data block D of unique ID i from the storage, denoted as D = (read, i) and formally
a 3-tuple (read, i,D); or
• Write a data block D of unique ID i to the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write, i,D).
To accomplish a private data access, the client usually needs to access multiple locations of the
storage. Each location access, which can be observed by the server, is one of the following types:
• Retrieve (i.e., read) a data block D from location l at the storage, denoted as D = (read, l)
and formally a 3-tuple (read, l,D); or
• Upload (i.e., write) a data blockD to location l at the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write, l,D).
Similar to the security definition of ORAM in the prior research [19, 54, 53], we define the security
of our proposed ORAM as follows.
Definition Let λ be a security parameter, and ~x = 〈 (op1, i1, D1), (op2, i2, D2), · · · 〉 denote a







2), · · · 〉 denote the sequence of the client’s location accesses (observed by
the server) in order to accomplish the data access sequence ~x. An ORAM system is said to be
secure if:
1. For any two equal-length private sequences ~x and ~y of data accesses, their corresponding
location access sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are computationally indistinguishable; and
2. The ORAM system fails to operate with a probability of O(2−λ).
5.3 The Proposed ORAM Scheme
To accomplish both server storage and communication efficiencies, we propose a new tree-based
ORAM scheme.
Like the existing tree-based ORAM schemes [49, 54], we organize the cloud server storage into a
tree structure. Whenever a data block is outsourced to the server, it is randomly assigned to a path,
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and can only stay in the path until it is retrieved to the client. Hence, the leaf nodes are required
to offer a space large enough to contain all the blocks that are randomly distributed to them;
meanwhile, the non-leaf nodes need to offer an additional space to buffer data blocks when they
are gradually evicted to the leaf nodes. Consequently, a high degree of storage space redundancy
exists in most of the existing tree-based ORAM schemes. To reduce storage redundancy, we first
adopt the following optimizations:
• To minimize the storage space of leaf nodes, we deliberately make the size of each leaf node to
be very large and only a small fraction of redundant space is introduced to ensure a negligible
probability of space overflow.
• To minimize the storage space of non-leaf nodes, we organize the tree as a k-ary (k > 2)
instead of binary tree to make the non-leaf nodes to have much smaller storage than the leaf
nodes.
The above optimizations, however, may significantly sacrifice the communication efficiency due to
the resulting large node sizes. In particular, the size of non-leaf nodes increases rapidly with k.
To address the conflicts, we further design new algorithms for data query and data eviction. The
delicately designed data query algorithm makes the communication cost per query to be a constant
independently of either the node size or the height of the tree. Based on a carefully selected value
k (i.e., eight) that balances the tradeoff between storage and communication efficiency, we design
an eviction scheme that runs after a certain large number of queries to evict a large batch of data
blocks at once; meanwhile, the cost of eviction can be spread over a long period of time through
the widely-adopted de-amortization technique [49, 53].
In the following, we present the detail of the scheme in terms of storage organization, system
initialization, data query, and data eviction. Here, N denotes the number of real data blocks
that the client wishes to export to the server. Adjustable system parameters, including s > 1,
0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < γ < 1, are introduced for the tradeoffs between security and costs. s
is a parameter controls the size of each node, α and γ controls how many dummy blocks introduced
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in a non-leaf node and β controls how many dummy blocks in a leaf node. The detail analysis of
these parameters can be found in Section 5.4.
5.3.1 Server-side Storage
The server-side storage is organized as a balanced tree, called storage tree, in which each non-
leaf node has up to eight child nodes. To hide the client’s access pattern to the server storage, the
server stores two types of data blocks: real blocks that each stores the user’s data and has block ID
in {1, · · · , N}; dummy blocks that each is randomly-generated based on some seed and has block
ID 0.
Specifically, let L′ = blog8 N3.5sc and Z
′ = N
8L
′ . If 3.5s ≤ Z ′ ≤ 7s, the storage tree is a complete
8-ary tree with height L = L′+ 1 and each leaf node storing Z0 = (1 +β)Z
′ blocks. Otherwise, the
storage tree is of height L = L′ + 2, and the root has b Z′3.5sc child nodes while each child node is a






node has a capacity of Z1 = 3.5(1 + α)s+ (1 + γ)s blocks. Each node ni is identified by a unique
tuple (li, idi), where li ∈ {0, · · · , L− 1} is the ID of the layer that the node resides (note: the root
node is at layer 0 while the leaf nodes are at layer L−1), and idi ≥ 0 is the ID of the node on layer
li that indicates the order of the node on layer li (from 0 at the leftmost to right).
For simplicity of presentation, we assume each non-leaf node has exactly eight child nodes
hereafter. Fig 5.1 illustrates the storage tree.
5.3.2 Client-side Storage
The client maintains the following types of storage.
A position map is a table with N entries, where each entry i ∈ {1, · · · , N} records the path
ID of block i (i.e., the ID of the leaf node on the path storing block i). Like other tree-based
ORAMs [49, 53, 54, 51], we also guarantees the following invariant: each real block is stored only
on the path identified by the path ID of the block.
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(0,0)Non-leaf: each node 
stores Z1 blocks.















Figure 5.1 Server Storage Organization.
For each node on the tree, the client keeps an index block which has one entry (id, ah) for
each block stored in the node. Here, id denotes the ID of the block and ah ∈ {0, 1, 2} indicates the
access history of the block since the system initialization or the most recent data eviction process
involving the node, whichever is more recent; specifically (i) ah = 0 if the block has not been
accessed; (ii) ah = 1 if the block has been accessed as a query target; (iii) ah = 2 if the block has
been accessed, but never as a query target.
The client keeps a random seed seed and an eviction count ce to track the number of evictions
that have been conducted so far. These two pieces of information are used to generate dummy
blocks. Specifically, when a dummy block needs to be generated to fill offset φ at node (l, id), the
client first calculates the version number v of the node based on ce and then the dummy block
is generated as PRF (seed, l, id, φ, v), where PRF is a pseudo-random generator that produces
a block based on the given inputs. The version number v of each node is initialized as 0 and
incremented after every eviction involving the node. For example, letting v(l,id) denote the version
number of node (l, id), then v(2,0) is incremented when ce = 1, 5, 9, · · · , v(2,2) is incremented when
ce = 2, 6, 10, · · · , v(2,1) is incremented when ce = 3, 7, 11, · · · , and v(2,3) is incremented when ce =
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4, 8, 12, · · · . In addition, the client allocates temporary buffers to store blocks during query and
eviction process, and some small storage to store secret keys used in encryption and decryption.
5.3.3 System Initialization
To initialize the system, the client encrypts all theN real data blocks using a certain probabilistic
encryption algorithm (e.g., AES with different initial vector for each encryption), randomly selects
a path for each block, and stores the blocks to the leaf nodes such that each block is at the leaf
node on the path selected for it. To hide the initial distribution of blocks to the leaf nodes, the leaf
nodes are also filled with dummy blocks to make each of them to have exactly Z0 real or dummy
blocks. The client also initiates each non-leaf nodes by filling it with Z1 dummy blocks.
5.3.4 Data Query
Suppose the client wishes to query block Dt not in its local buffer, where t ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}
denotes the ID of the block. It looks up the position map to obtain pt, which is the path ID of the
node, and looks up the index blocks of path pt to identify the node that stores Dt. Then, the client
selects path pt as the query path and launches the following query process.
Selecting Blocks to Access For each non-leaf node n′i on path pt (where i = 0, · · · , L − 2
represents the layer ID of the node), the client selects one block to access according to the following
rules: if n′i contains Dt, Dt is selected; otherwise, a non-accessed dummy block is randomly selected.
For the leaf node on pt, the client selects one or two blocks to download. Specifically, let S0, S1
and S2 denote the sets of blocks with ah values 0, 1 and 2 respectively, and s0, s1 and s2 denote
the cardinalities of the sets. Then the client applies the following rules: If the leaf node contains
Dt, depending on the access history of Dt, there are following cases.
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• Case I: Dt ∈ S0. The client picks the target to download. If s1 + s2 > 0, the client
also randomly picks one block from S1 with probability ρ or from S2 otherwise (i.e., with





• Case II: Dt ∈ S1 ∪S2. The client picks the target to download and meanwhile, picks another
block randomly from S0 to access.
If the leaf node does not contain the query target, the client randomly picks one block from S0 and
another one from S1 ∪ S2 to access.
To summarize, let φ0, · · · , φL−2 denote the offsets of the blocks selected from layers 0, · · · , L−2
respectively, and φL−1,0 and φL−1,1 denote the offsets of the blocks selected from the leaf node.
Downloading Blocks The client sends request Q = 〈φ0, · · · , φL−2, φL−1,0, φL−1,1〉 to the
server. Upon receiving the request, the server picks block D′i from offset φi in node n
′
i of path pt,
for each i ∈ {0, · · · , L − 2}. Then, it conducts bit-wise XOR on each group of bits with the same
offsets in these blocks, to obtain block D′ = D′0 ⊕ · · · ⊕D′L−2. After that, the server sends to the
client D′ together with blocks D′L−1,0 and D
′
L−1,1 located at offsets φL−1,0 and φL−1,1 in the leaf
node.
Recovering Target Block Upon receiving the three blocks from the server, if the target
block is one of D′L−1,0 and D
′
L−1,1, the client gets the target block immediately. Otherwise, the
client re-generates target block from D′ as follows. The client re-generates each dummy block D′i
selected from offset φ at node (l, id), by D′i = PRF (seed, l, id, φ, v) where v is the version of node
(l, id). Then, Dt = D
′ ⊕ (⊕(∀i)D′i 6=DtD
′
i).
Updating Index Blocks Finally the client updates the index blocks maintained by itself by:
marking the copy of target block remaining on the storage tree as a dummy block that has been
accessed as target; marking the other selected blocks as have been accessed.
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Fig 5.2 shows examples of query process: In (a), the query target block is a non-accessed block
located at a non-leaf node, while in (b), the query target block is located at a leaf node and has
been accessed before. In both cases, one non-accessed block is always accessed from each non-leaf
node on the query path while two blocks (one has been accessed and the other has not) are accessed




































Figure 5.2 Query Examples.
5.3.5 Data Eviction
After every s queries, the client has retained at its buffer s blocks that are the targets of the
most recent s queries. We call these blocks as the current evicting blocks. The client randomly
re-selects a path ID for each evicting block, and then launches a data eviction process. Note that,
like in some existing ORAM constructions [53], the eviction (or shuffling) process can be carried
out concurrently with data query processes and the process can spread over a long period of time.
Our proposed eviction process can be de-amortized using the similar technology. To focus on the
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basic ideas of this construction, we assume here that the eviction process is executed before any
further data query is processed.
Each eviction process involves only one path, which we call eviction path, of the storage tree.
The eviction path is selected in the reverse-lexicographic order, as used in [11]. The eviction process
runs iteratively, one iteration for each node on the eviction path. We introduce variable n′e to denote
the node currently involved in the eviction. Hence, n′e is initialized to n0,0 (i.e., the root node).
To facilitate the explanation, we further divide the real blocks in n′e, when n
′
e is not a leaf node,
into up to eight groups denoted as g0, · · · , gx−1 where x represents the number of child nodes of
n′e. Here, gi for i = 0, · · · , x − 1 is the set of real blocks in n′e that can only be evicted to a child
denoted as n′e,i of n
′
e, because the paths associated with the blocks in gi all pass through n
′
e and
n′e,i. Note that, the grouping is just a temporary and logical grouping, which is known only by the
client during eviction without requiring any data structure to keep the state. Next, we elaborate
the operations of each iteration, which is also illustrated in Fig 5.3.
When n′e is a non-leaf node and its child n
′
e,c (c ∈ {0, · · · , x−1}) is the next node on the eviction
path, the eviction is conducted as follows. First, the client retrieves the 3.5(1 + α)s blocks, which
must include the non-accessed real blocks, from n′e; note that there is no need to retrieve the other
(1 + γ)s blocks, which must include the already-accessed blocks, as it is public knowledge that at
least (1+γ)s blocks are dummy. The real blocks from n′e are divided into x groups, and the current
evicting blocks at the client’s buffer are distributed into the x groups according to their path IDs.
Second, the client merges the real blocks in groups c + 1, · · · , x − 1, 0, · · · , c − 1, re-encrypts
them, randomly permutes them, inserts randomly-generated dummy blocks to them to make the
total number of such blocks be 3.5(1 + α)s+ (1 + γ)s, and uploads the blocks back to n′e.
Third, the client retains the remaining real blocks, i.e., the blocks in group c, at the buffer.
These blocks now become the new set of current evicting blocks, which will be evicted to child
node n′e,c in the next iteration. Also, the client updates variable n
′
e to represent child node n
′
e,c;
that is, n′e,c now becomes the evicting node. Then, the next iteration of the eviction process starts.
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Figure 5.3 Eviction Overview.
When n′e is a leaf node, the client downloads all the blocks currently in n
′
e, and merges the
blocks with the current evicting blocks. Among these blocks, if the number of real blocks is more
than Z0, the client declares failure and aborts. Otherwise, the client adds or removes dummy blocks
to the make the total number of blocks to be Z0, and randomly permutes and re-encrypts them
before uploading them back to n′e.
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5.4 Security Analysis
Now we study the failure probability and the obliviousness of the proposed ORAM.
5.4.1 Failure Probability Analysis
5.4.1.1 Failure Probability for A Query Process
According to Section 5.3, a query process fails at a node ni on layer i, for two cases:
• the ρ computed according to Equation (5.1) is greater than 1; i.e., si,1 · (si,0 + si,2) > si,0 ·
(si,1 + si,2), a.k.a., si,1 > si,0;
• when ni is a non-leaf node that does not contain the target block, but it does not have
non-accessed dummy blocks.
Lemma 5. The probability for a non-leaf node to use up (1 + γ)s dummy blocks before it involves
an eviction process is O(2−λ), as long as γ ≥ 0.25 and s ≥ 25λ.
Proof. Between two consecutive evictions, the average time for a non-leaf node to be on a query
path is s. Hence, due to the Chernoff bound, the probability for the node to be on a query path





which is less than 2−λ as long as s ≥ 25λ and γ ≥ 0.25.
As it is hard to directly compute Pr[si,1 > si,0], we instead compute Pr[si,1 + si,2 > si,0].
Since Pr[si,1 + si,2 > si,0] ≥ Pr[si,1 > si,0], Pr[si,1 + si,2 > si,0] is an upper bound of the failure
probability of a query process.
47
Lemma 6. Let ni denote an arbitrary node on layer i of the storage tree, and ξi denote the total
number of nodes on the layer. If ni is involved in at least one eviction process after every x queries





where γ = ξi·3.5(1+α)s2x − 1.
Proof. For every x queries launched by the client, on average there are q̃ = xξi query processes that
have ni on their selected query paths, because of the randomness in the path selection for blocks
and that layer i has ξi blocks.
Therefore, the probability for q̂ = 3.5(1+α)s2 or more of these queries to select ni on their query





where γ = q̂q̃ − 1 =
ξi·3.5(1+α)s
2x − 1, according to the multiplicative Chernoff bound.
Note that, a query will not fail at ni if ni has not been on the query paths for q̂ times, because
si,0 > si,1 + si,2 if ni has been on less than q̂ query paths.
Hence the lemma is proved.
Based on the above Lemmas, we have the following main theorem regarding the failure proba-
bility of a query process.
Theorem 4. (Failure Probability for A Query Process.) When an eviction process is always
launched after every s queries and completed before any further query, a query process fails at
a node with a probability of O(2−λ) as long as α ≥ 0.34, γ ≥ 0.25 and s ≥ 25λ.
Proof. On the storage tree, for every node ni on layer i with totally ξi nodes, it is involved in an
eviction after every x = ξi · s queries. Then, applying Lemma 5, 6 with x = ξi · s, the theorem is
proved.
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5.4.1.2 Failure Probability for An Eviction Process
An eviction process can fail if and only if one of the following scenarios occurs. (i) Failure
Scenario I: This scenario occurs during an eviction iteration (detailed in Section 5.3.5) with a
non-leaf node as the current evicting node. After the current evicting blocks are merged with the
existing blocks at the current evicting node, there are more than 3.5(1 + α)s real blocks that can
only be evicted to the child nodes other than the next evicting node. This would require more than
3.5(1 + α)s real blocks (i.e., less than (1 + γ)s dummy blocks) to be uploaded to a non-leaf node
and thus would lead to space overflow at the node. (ii) Failure Scenario II: This scenario occurs
during the eviction iteration with a leaf node (with capacity Z0 blocks) as the current evicting
node. When the current evicting blocks are merged with the existing blocks at the current evicting
node, the total number of real blocks become more than Z0.
Lemma 7. As long as α ≥ 0.34 and s ≥ 25λ, the Failure Scenario I occurs with a probability of
O(2−λ).
Proof. Let us consider a non-leaf current evicting node n′e. Without loss of generality, we assume
the leftmost child (i.e., child 0) of n′e is the next evicting node. After the current evicting blocks
have been merged with the blocks in n′e, all of these blocks are grouped into eight groups, where
each group gi for i = 0, · · · , 7 includes the real blocks that can only be evicted to child i.
Each gi includes the real blocks evicted to n
′
e in the last 8− i eviction processes that involve n′e.





can only be evicted to child i of n′e, the average size of gi, denoted as |gi|, is 8−i8 · s blocks. Thus,
according to the multiplicative Chernoff bound, the probability for |gi| > 8−i8 · s · (1 + αi), i.e.








According to inequality (5.3), when s ≥ 25λ, α1 ≥ 0.265, α2 ≥ 0.285, α3 ≥ 0.31, α4 ≥ 0.35,
α5 ≥ 0.41, α6 ≥ 0.5, and α7 ≥ 0.74, it holds that Pr[|gi| > 8−i8 · s · (1 + αi)] < 2











·s] ≥ 0.339, the Failure Scenario I occurs with a probability less than 7 ∗ 2
−λ,
i.e., O(2−λ).
Lemma 8. As long as β ≥ 0.13 and s ≥ 25λ, the Failure Scenario II occurs with a probability of
O(2−λ).
Proof. According to the server storage organization, each leaf node has a capacity of Z ′ blocks
where Z ′ ≥ 3.5(1 + β)s. For each leaf node with ID i, let us use random variable xi to denote the
number of real blocks that have i as their path IDs and x̄i to denote the mean of xi. Thus, it holds
that x̄i =
Z′
1+β due to the following reasoning: Each node has exactly eight child nodes, the total
number of leaf nodes is 8L
′
, and thus x̄i =
N
8L′
. Meanwhile, Z ′ = (1 + β) N
8L′
. Therefore, x̄i =
Z′
1+β .
Furthermore, due to the multiplicative Chernoff bound, for any leaf node with ID i:




Considering that x̄i ≥ 3.5s, Pr[xi ≥ Z ′] < 2−λ when β ≥ 0.13 and s ≥ 25λ.
Hence, the Lemma is proved.
Theorem 5. (Failure Probability of an Eviction Process.) An eviction process fails at a node with
a probability of O(2−λ), as long as α ≥ 0.34, β ≥ 0.13 and s ≥ 25λ.
Proof. (Proved based on Lemmas 7 and 8.)
Let consider an eviction step and introduce the following notations:
• ni: the current evicting node, which is a non-leaf node at layer i.
• Ei: the set of the current evicting blocks.
• Smi : the set of target blocks for the most recent m · s queries.
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Lemma 9. Ei is the subset of S8
i
i that must be evicted to the subtree rooted at ni.
Proof. (By induction on layer i.) Base Case: When i = 0 (i.e., the root node is the current evicting
node), Ei is the set of the most recently queried s = 8i blocks, which must all be evicted to n0.
Induction step: Suppose the proposition holds for all the nodes on layer i = 0, · · · , l− 1. When
i = l (i.e., the current evicting node nl is at layer l), let nl−1 be the parent of nl. El must be
from the blocks that were evicted to nl−1 during the most recent 8 eviction processes involving this
parent, and only the blocks that must be evicted to the subtree rooted at nl. Note that, when nl−1
was the current evicting node, the current evicting blocks were from S8l−1l−1 , which was the most
recent 8l−1 · · · s queries at the time. Thus, El must be from the most recent 8l · s queries, i.e., S8
l
l .
Therefore, as El is from 8 of such sets, it holds that Ei is the subset of S8
l
l that must be evicted
to the subtree rooted at nl.
Hence, the lemma is proved based on the above steps.




)s/8, no more than (1 + α) s8 blocks among Ei must be evicted to ni,c.
Proof. Let xi,c denote the number of blocks in Ei that must be evicted to the subtree rooted at
ni,c. The average value of xi,c is
s
8 because: (i) there are 8
i+1 distinct nodes on layer i+ 1 (i.e., the
layer ni,c resides); (ii) according to Lemma 9, Ei is a subset of S8
i
i (with 8
i blocks) that must be
evicted to the subtree rooted at ni. According to the multiplicative Chernoff bound, xi,c >
(1+α)s
8











Hence, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 11. Assume ni,c, where c ∈ {0, · · · , 7}, be the child of ni that is the next evicting node.






there are less than 3.5(1 + α)s blocks in ni that must be evicted to the child nodes of ni other than
ni,c.
Proof. After the blocks in Ei have been evicted to node ni, the blocks in ni that must be evicted
to child node ni,c+j mod 8, which we denoted as Si,(c+j)%8 where j = 1, · · · , 7, are from the blocks
evicted to ni in the last 8− j eviction processes that involve ni. According to Lemma 10, Si,(c+j)%8







j=1 Si,(c+j)%8 has no more than
7∑
j=1
(8− j)(1 + α)s = 28(1 + α)s
8
= 3.5(1 + α)s








Hence, the lemma is proved.
Second, we study Failure Scenario II, by stating and proving the following Lemma.







there are no more than Z real blocks in a leaf node.
Proof. The server-side storage tree has (1+β)NZ leaf nodes, i.e.,
N
7s root-to-leaf paths; each of the
N real blocks is randomly associated with one of these paths. Hence, for each leaf node with ID
(L − 1, j), where j ∈ {0, N7s − 1}, on average there are 7s real blocks have path ID equal to j.
According to the multiplicative Chernoff Bound, the probability for no more than 7(1 + β)s blocks





Hence, the lemma is proved.
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5.4.2 Obliviousness Analysis
5.4.2.1 Obliviousness in Query Path Selection
When the system is initialized, the path ID of each block is selected randomly and independently
of each other. After a block has been queried, its path ID is re-selected randomly and independently
of the client’s data access pattern. Due to the randomness in the selection of path ID, the query
path of each query process, which is the determined by the path ID of the query target block, is
random and independent of the client’s access pattern.
5.4.2.2 Obliviousness in Block Access from Query Path
According to the data query algorithm, the following access pattern has been followed: for a
non-leaf node, if it contains the target block, the target block is accessed, otherwise, a randomly
non-accessed dummy block is accessed. So the block accessed from a non-leaf node must have not
been accessed before and is randomly selected. For a leaf node, the client must select one block
that has already been accessed and one block that has not been accessed to access. Furthermore,
the following Lemma 13 shows that, each of the blocks that have already been accessed has the
same probability to be selected and each of the blocks that have not been accessed also has the
same probability to be selected. Hence, each query process is also random and independent of the
data access pattern.
Lemma 13. In every node on the query path selected for a query process, all the un-accessed blocks
within the node have the same probability to be accessed; all the already-accessed blocks within the
node have the same probability to be accessed.
Proof. Let us re-use the notations used in the data query algorithm (Section 5.3). For any node
n′i 6= nt (i.e., the node does not contain the query target) on the query path, there are two cases:
• If the node has not been accessed since its most recent construction, one block is randomly
selected to access; i.e., each block has the same probability 12.4s to be accessed.
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• If the node has been accessed before, one block is randomly selected from Si,0 to access
(i.e., each block is Si,0 has the same probability of
1
si,0
to be accessed), and another block
is randomly selected from Si,1 ∪ Si,2 to access (i.e., each block in Si,1 ∪ Si,2 has the same
probability of 1si,1+si,2 to be accessed).
For node n′i = nt (i.e., the node contains the query target) on the query path, if the node has not
been accessed since its most recent eviction involving it (note: the system initialization is treated
as an eviction process), Dt is any block on the node with the same probability
1
2.4s . According to




If the node has been accessed since its most recent eviction, Si,0 is the set of blocks that have
not been accessed, Si,1 is the set of blocks that have been accessed before as target, and Si,2 is
the set of blocks that have been accessed before as non-target (i.e., dummy). Dt has the same
probability to be any block belonging to Si,0 ∪ Si,2; that is, it is in Si,0 with probability si,0si,0+si,2 or
in Si,2 with probability
si,2
si,0+si,2
. According to the query algorithm:
• If Dt is in Si,0 (occurring with probability si,0si,0+si,2 ), Dt is selected to access (i.e., each block
in Si,0 has the probability of
1
si,0
to be accessed); meanwhile, another block is randomly




to be accessed) or from Si,2 otherwise (i.e., each block in Si,2 has the




• If Dt is in Si,2 (occurring with probability si,2si,0+si,2 ), Dt is selected to access (i.e., each block in
Si,2 has the probability of
1
si,2
to be accessed); meanwhile, another block is randomly selected








each block in Si,1 has the probability of
si,0
si,0 + si,2






to be accessed; each block in Si,2 also has the probability of
si,0
si,0 + si,2











Hence, the lemma is proved.
5.4.2.3 Obliviousness in eviction process
The eviction process is random and independent of the client’s data access pattern, due to
the following reasons: (i) Each eviction process involves only one root-to-leaf path (called eviction
path), and the order in which the paths are selected for as eviction paths is fixed and independent of
data access pattern. (ii) During each eviction process, the processing for each node on the selected
eviction path follows a fixed pattern which is independent of data access pattern: all the data
blocks on the node are retrieved to the client; the blocks are all re-encrypted by the client; then,
the same number of blocks (but may or may not be the same set of blocks) are uploaded back to
the node.
Based on the above analysis, along with the fact that one eviction process always follows every
s query processes, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 6. As long as system parameters α ≥ 0.34, β ≥ 0.13, γ ≥ 0.25 and s ≥ 25λ, the proposed
ORAM is secure under Definition 5.2.
5.5 Performance Comparison
We have implemented our proposed Octopus ORAM, and conducted performance comparisons
between Octopus ORAM and several state-of-the-art ORAM constructions that are the most re-
lated. Specifically, we conduct the following comparisons:
• We compare Octopus ORAM to Partition ORAM [53], which is one of the most communication-
efficient ORAM that does not require intensive computation or multiple servers and shares
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the same assumption with Octopus ORAM in that the client has a decent amount of local
storage space (in particular, it assumes the client to have a local storage of O(
√
N) blocks).
• We compare Octopus ORAM with Path ORAM, which is one of the most communication-
efficient ORAM that does not require intensive computation and only requires a small local
storage (i.e., O(logN) blocks).
5.5.1 Comparison with Partition ORAM
In the evaluation, the system parameters s, α, β and γ are adapted according to N (i.e., the
number of outsourced real blocks) to make the client-side storage size similar to that of Partition
ORAM while assuring the failure probability of our constructions to be lower than 2−40. Note that,
we have not implemented the Partition ORAM due to the lack of details on optimizations adopted
by that design; so we use the performance results reported in [53] in this comparison. Also the
block size is set to 64 KB, as used in [53].
Table 5.1 Practical Performance Comparisons
Capacity # Blocks













64 GB 220 204 MB 289.2 MB 141 GB 22 GB 22.5 X 48.5 X
256 GB 222 415 MB 292.7 MB 563 GB 87.6 GB 24.1 X 60.4 X
1 TB 224 858 MB 307 MB 2.2 TB 349.4 GB 25.9 X 60.4 X
16 TB 228 4.2 GB 592 MB 35 TB 5.4 TB 29.5 X 84 X
256TB 232 31 GB 5.15 GB 563 TB 87.3 TB 32.7 X 95.9 X
1024TB 234 101 GB 20.7 GB 2048 TB 349.5 TB 34.4 X 107.7 X
Table 5.1 compares the ORAM constructions in terms of communication cost, client-side storage
cost and server-side storage overhead. The client-side storage cost includes all the permanent or
temporary storage space allocated at the client side, and the server-side storage overhead, which is
computed as all the storage space allocated at the server side minus the storage space necessary to
store the N real data blocks. We have the following observations from the table.
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• Octopus ORAM’s server storage overhead is only 12-16% of that incurred by Partition ORAM;
note that, the storage overhead of Partition ORAM is more than twice of that necessary for
storing the real blocks. This improvement in storage efficiency is important in practice, when
the storage size is large. In the client’s perspective, as we discussed in Chapter 1, the monetary
cost of renting large space is comparable to or even higher than the communication cost, and
hence it is desired to reduce the server-side storage. In the server’s perspective, lower server
storage overhead means lower monetary cost to maintain/upgrade storage devices and less
labors to manage the space.
• Octopus ORAM incurs a client-server communication cost that is about 1.4-1.5 times of that
by Partition ORAM. This demonstrates the tradeoff between the communication and the
server-side storage costs.
5.5.2 Comparison with Path ORAM
To evaluate the performance of Octopus ORAM in a practical application scenario, we rented
two AWS EC2 instances to run server and client software. The communication bandwidth between
the two instance is around 700 Mbps (as measured using LANBench [48]), with a round trip delay
of 50 ms added intentionally (as done in [61]), in order to simulate a practical scenario that the
client has a high-speed Internet connection with the server. The instances are both of type AWS
m4.xlarge, each has 4 vCPUs, 2.4 GHz, Intel Xeon E5-2686v4, and 16 GB memory.
For comparison purpose, we implemented Path ORAM (with index table stored at the client)
and run the system on the same platform. The two constructions are compared in terms of the
following metrics:
• Communication Cost per Query, which is measured as the average amount of data uploaded
to or downloaded from the server, per query, in the unit of data block.
• Query Delay, which is measured as the average time elapse from when the client sends out
a query request to when the client has received and decrypted the query target block. This
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measures the query delay experienced by the client at the ideal scenario (i.e., a query request
does not wait locally).
• Processing Time per Query, which is measured as the average time elapse from when the
client sends out a query request to when the query and associated eviction operations have
been completed and the client is able to send the next query. Note that, for simplicity, we do
not process multiple queries concurrently.
We also compare their storage cost, and study the tradeoff in the above performance metrics. In
the comparison, the parameters of Octopus ORAM are set as follows: λ = 40, s = 1024, α = 0.34,
β = 0.13 and γ = 0.25. For Path ORAM, the capacity of each node is set to 5 blocks. We choose
N to range from 220 to 226, and block size B to range from 128 KB to 1 MB.
Communication Cost per Query. Figure 5.4 compares the communication cost per query
between Octopus ORAM and Path ORAM. As we can see, the communication cost incurred by
Octopus ORAM is 19-21% of that by Path ORAM, as N and B vary.
Query Delay. Figure 5.5 compares the average query delay between Octopus ORAM and
Path ORAM. As we can see, the average query delay incurred by Octopus ORAM is 8-33 % of
that by Path ORAM. This is mainly because: Octopus ORAM separates the query process from
the eviction process, its query process only needs to download 2 or 3 blocks, and a query target
block can be accessed immediately (if target block is in leaf node), or after generates and runs
simple XOR operation (if target block is in non-leaf node) after the query process finishes. Path
ORAM, on the other hand, combines the query and eviction processes. A query target block can
be accessed, in the average case, only after the combined query and eviction process has download
and decrypt half of the blocks that need to be processed, and the number of such blocks is much
larger than that in Octopus ORAM.
Also note that, the average query delay is only about 20-200 ms with the above settings.
Processing Time per Query. Figure 5.6 compares the average processing time per query
between Octopus ORAM and Path ORAM. As we can see from the figure, the average processing























































































































































(c) B = 512KB (d) B = 1MB
Figure 5.4 Comparing Communication Cost per Query Between Octopus ORAM and Path
ORAM.
ORAM has smaller communication cost per query; (ii) Octopus ORAM separates query and eviction
processes, which can be run in parallel and thus also reduce the processing time.
Storage Cost and Overhead. Table 5.2 compares Path ORAM and Octopus ORAM in
terms of client-side storage cost and server-side storage overhead. As we can see, the server-side
storage overhead of Octopus ORAM is only 130 of that of Path ORAM. Meanwhile, Octopus ORAM





























































































































(c) B = 512KB (d) B = 1MB
Figure 5.5 Comparing Query Delay Between Octopus ORAM and Path ORAM.
5.6 Summary
We have proposed and evaluated a new ORAM construction called Octopus ORAM. Compared
to state-of-the-art ORAM constructions, Octopus ORAM significantly improves the storage effi-
ciency at the server and achieves the comparable level of communication efficiency, at the cost of
increased client-side storage consumption. As we target at the application setting of hybrid cloud
systems, the increased client-side storage consumption should be affordable to the clients who have



































































































































(c) B = 512KB (d) B = 1MB
Figure 5.6 Comparing the Processing Time per Query between Octopus ORAM and Path
ORAM.
Table 5.2 Comparing Storage Efficiency between Octopus ORAM and Path ORAM
Capacity # Blocks
Client Storage Cost Server Storage Overhead
Path ORAM Octopus ORAM Path ORAM Octopus ORAM
64 GB 220 0.25 MB 64.5 MB 576 GB 18.8 GB
256 GB 222 1 MB 66 MB 2.2 TB 76 GB
1 TB 224 4 MB 72 MB 9 TB 304 GB
4TB 226 16 MB 96 MB 36 TB 1.2 TB
16 TB 228 64 MB 192 MB 144 TB 4.7 TB
64 TB 230 256 MB 576 MB 576 TB 19 TB
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CHAPTER 6. THREE-SERVER OCTOPUS ORAM
6.1 Research Goal and Contributions
In chapter 5 we proposed Octopus ORAM [34] which reduces client-server communication cost
to O(logN ·B), some of the state-of-the-art achieve O(B) communication cost. In this chapter we
aim at reduce client-server communication cost to O(B) while at the same time keep the server
storage overhead low. Also, we remove the assumption in chapter 5 and most of related work,
which is the server is semi-honest. In this chapter, we assume the servers will not collude with each
other, but they could be malicious.
Similar to S3ORAM[26], our proposed three-server Octopus ORAM [35] also recruits three
non-colluding cloud servers to act as the oblivious storage. But we significantly reduce the server
storage overhead by storing only around 0.3N extra dummy blocks compared to 11N dummy
blocks required by S3ORAM. Moreover, we design and employ several lightweight accountability
mechanisms for the servers, such that each server can detect the misbehavior of other servers that
interact with it. Compared to the state-of-the-art, our proposed scheme can simultaneously attain
the following features:
• provable protection of clients’ access pattern privacy;
• low server storage overhead, which is around 0.3N blocks for every N real data blocks ex-
ported;
• low data query delay, which is only slightly longer than a communication round trip time
between the client and server;
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• accountability with multiple servers, which removes the less-realistic semi-honest assumption
in a multi-server oblivious storage system;
• lower communication costs than S3ORAM, the most related state-of-the-art scheme.
The above features are achieved by our novel designs of storage arrangement, data query algorithm
and eviction algorithm. Note that, our scheme has made full use of the available moderate level
of client-side storage, but the required storage capacity is still only as small as around 0.1% of the
cloud server’s storage capacity.
In this chapter, we use the system model and security definition in chapter 2. We present the
detailed design in terms of storage organization, query algorithm, eviction algorithm and account-
ability enhancements in section 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. Section 6.6 presents the security analysis.
Performance evaluation and comparisons are reported in Section 6.7. Finally, Section 6.8 concludes
the chapter.
6.2 System Architecture and Initialization
As shown in Figure 6.1, our proposed system is composed of one client and three servers, denoted
as S0, S1 and S2. Only one server (i.e., S0) needs to permanently store the data blocks exported
by the client. The other two servers only store some meta-data and temporarily buffer some data
blocks, to facilitate data query and eviction processes as well as to maintain system accountability,
which are detailed in Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. The client also stores meta-data and a small subset
of data blocks. In the following, we elaborate the storage organization at server S0 and the client.
6.2.1 Storage Organization at Server S0
Let positive integers m1 and q, and positives fractions α and β be system parameters. Let
ξ(m, q) = max(
(m− 1) · q
2
, 2q). (6.1)
1m is a power of 2.
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Figure 6.1 Three-server Octopus ORAM Architecture.
The data blocks are stored into an m-ary storage tree, in which each non-leaf node can have up
to m child nodes. When constructing the storage tree, we make the tree to be balanced and the
number of data blocks at each leaf node to vary between (1 + β) · ξ(m, q) and 2(1 + β) · ξ(m, q), for
certain security purposes explained later in Section 6.6.
Specifically, the tree is constructed as follows:
• Let L′ = blogm Nξ(m,q)c and Z
′ = N
mL′
. Obviously, Z ′ ≥ ξ(m, q).
• If Z ′ ≤ 2ξ(m, q), the storage tree is organized as a complete m-ary tree with height L = L′+1
where the capacity of each leaf node is Z0 = d(1 + β) · Z ′e blocks.
• Otherwise (i.e., Z ′ > 2ξ(m, q)), the storage tree is organized as a tree of height L = L′ + 2,
and the root has b Z′ξ(m,q)c child nodes while each child node is a root of a complete m-ary tree





e blocks at each leaf node.
• Each non-leaf node has a capacity of Z1 = d(1 + α) · ξ(m, q)e blocks.
Each node Nl,i is identified by a unique tuple (l, i), where l ∈ {0, · · · , L− 1} is the ID of the layer
that the node resides (note: the root node is at layer 0 while the leaf nodes are at layer L− 1), and
64
i ≥ 0 is the ID of the node on layer l that equals to the offset of the node on layer l (from 0 at the
leftmost towards right). Note that Figure 6.1 shows a storage tree when m = 8.
6.2.2 Storage Organization at the Client
The client maintains an index table for all of the N real data blocks and an index block for each
node on the storage tree. The index table has N entries and each entry i ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1} has the
following fields:
• path ID of block i, i.e., the ID of the leaf node on the path that block i is assigned to;
• secret key ki which, as detailed in Section 6.2.3, randomly selected by the client to encrypt
the block based on XOR operation;
• three message authentication codes (MACs) of the block, of which the computation and usage
are explained in detail in Section 6.5.
Note that, following most of the tree-based ORAM constructions [49, 53, 16, 54, 51], our proposed
scheme also enforces the policy that, a block is assigned to a path and the block must be stored on
the path.
For each node on the tree, the index block has one entry (id, ah) for each block it stores,
where id is the ID of the block, no matter whether the block is real or dummy, and ah ∈ {0, 1, 2}
indicates the access history of the block since the system initialization or the most recent data
eviction process involving the node, whichever is more recent: (i) ah = 0 if the block has not been
accessed; (ii) ah = 1 if the block has been accessed as a query target; and (iii) ah = 2 if the block
has been accessed but never as a query target.
In addition, the client maintains a local buffer that stores the most recently accessed data
blocks. The capacity of the buffer is at least q blocks.
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6.2.3 System Initialization
The client picks a pseudo random number generator PRG0(k), which takes a secret seed k of
λ bits and outputs a pseudo-random sequence of 3λ bits. The client also picks and shares with
the servers another pseudo random number generator function, denoted as PRG1(k), which takes
a secret seed k and outputs a pseudo-random sequence of bytes with the same length as a data
block.
Before each real block (denoted as ~Di which is a sequence of bits) of ID i is exported to server
S0, the client encrypts the block as follows.
1. It randomly picks a secret seed ki, and computes PRG0(ki) whose output is denoted as
ki,0||ki,1||ki,2 where each ki,j has λ bits and | represents concatenation.
2. It computes PRG1(ki,0), PRG1(ki,1) and PRG1(ki,2) to generate three pseudo-random se-
quences of bytes, denoted as ~Ri,0, ~Ri,1 and ~Ri,2, each of the same length as a data block.
3. It performs bit-wise XOR operations on each group of four bits with the same offset of the
four bit-sequences ~Di, ~Ri,0, ~Ri,1 and ~Ri,2, to encrypt ~Di to
~D′i =
~Di ⊕ ~Ri,0 ⊕ ~Ri,1 ⊕ ~Ri,2. (6.2)
6.3 Data Query Algorithm
Assume the client wishes to query data block ~Dt, where t denotes the block ID, and the block
is not in its local buffer. It looks up its index table to find path pt that contains ~Dt, and looks up
the index blocks of the path to locate the node containing ~Dt. Then, it launches a query process
in two phases: selecting some data blocks to access from S0, based on the index table and index
blocks that it stores, in order to hide the query target; interacting with the servers to retrieve query
target ~Dt.
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6.3.1 Phase I: Selecting Data Blocks to Access
For each node N ′i on path pt, where i ∈ {0, · · · , L− 1} represents the layer ID of the node, let
∆i,0, ∆i,1 and ∆i,2 denote the block sets with ah being 0, 1 and 2, and δi,0, δi,1 and δi,2 denote
the sizes of these sets, respectively. The client selects data blocks from each node N ′i to download,
according to the rules presented in Algorithm 1, with the dual goals of hiding data access pattern
and communication efficiency.
Algorithm 1 Rules for Selecting Blocks from N ′i to Access (Output: ∆ - a set of blocks selected
to access)
1: ∆← ∅
2: if N ′i contains query target ~Dt then
3: add ~Dt to ∆
4: ∀ ~D ∈ ∆i,1, add ~D to ∆ with probability 1δi,0
5: if ~Dt belongs to ∆i,0 then
6: ∀ ~D ∈ ∆i,2, add ~D to ∆ with probability δi,2δ2i,0
7: else //i.e., ~Dt belongs to ∆i,2
8: randomly picks one ~D from ∆i,0; adds it to ∆
9: end if
10: else
11: randomly picks one ~D from ∆i,0; adds it to ∆
12: ∀ ~D ∈ ∆i,1 ∪∆i,2, add ~D to ∆ with probability 1δi,0
13: end if
First, the algorithm hides data access pattern by making each block in N ′i to be accessed with
the same probability independently of where the query target resides, as stated in the following
Lemma 14 with proof.
Lemma 14. During a query process with query path pt, each block ~D in node N ′i on pt is selected to
access with the same probability of 1δi,0 , which is obviously independent of the location of the query
target.
Proof. When the query target does not belong to N ′i , every block ~D is accessed with probability
1
δi,0
based on lines 10-11 of Algorithm 1. Otherwise, each block ~D must be in ∆i,0, ∆i,1 or ∆i,2. So
we consider the three cases respectively.
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• Case I: ~D ∈ ∆i,0. Further there are two subcases: ∆i,0 contains the query target or not.
– Subcase I-a: ∆i,0 contains query target ~Dt. Only ~Dt is accessed from ∆i,0. Further due




be accessed as query target.
– Subcase I-b: ∆i,0 contains query target ~Dt. Based on line 8 of the algorithm, every ~D
has the probability of 1δi,0 to be accessed.
• Case II: ~D ∈ ∆i,1. Every ~D has the probability of 1δi,0 to be accessed, based on line 4 of the
algorithm.
• Case III: ~D ∈ ∆i,2. Further there are two subcases:












case III. In this subcase, ~D is accessed as the query target with probability 1δi,2 .














Hence, the Lemma is proved.
Second, in terms of communication efficiency, the query algorithm requires only 1 +
δi,1+δi,2
δi,0
blocks accessed from each node N ′i . Further, as we study later in Section 6.6,
δi,1+δi,2
δi,0
< 1 with an
overwhelming probability of 1− 2−λ. That is, no more than 2 blocks are accessed from each node
N ′i on the query path with a probability at least 1− 2−λ.
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6.3.2 Phase II: Retrieving Query Target
The client sends a request to S0, which contains:
• list ~B = 〈b1, · · · , bx〉 of x block indices where, in each bi = (ni, oi), ni is the ID of a block on
query path and oi is the offset of a block selected to access in Phase I;
• random permutation vector ~V = 〈v1, · · · , vx〉 of integers {1, · · · , x}, which directs S0 to put
every block bi to offset vi after the permutation.
It also sends a request to S1, which only contains one number in {1, · · · , x}.
In response to the client’s request, S0 makes a copy of the blocks indicated by ~B, permutes the
blocks as directed by ~V , and then forwards the resulting block sequence to S1.
Upon receiving the sequence, S1 retains only the query target block, whose offset on the sequence
is the index contained in the client’s request, and immediately returns the block to the client.
Having received the query target, the client updates its local meta-data to make the copy of
the query target left on the storage tree as a dummy block. Then, it can start reading or writing
to the query target locally.
6.4 Data Eviction Algorithm
After every q queries, the client has retained at its buffer q blocks that are the targets of the
most recent q queries. We call these blocks the current evicting blocks. The client randomly re-
assigns a path for each evicting block, sends all these blocks in an ordered list to server S1, and
then launches a data eviction process to evict them into the storage tree at server S0. Note that, as
in existing ORAM constructions such as [53], the eviction process can be carried out concurrently
with data query processes through some de-amortization mechanism. Due to page limit, we skip
the de-amortization detail and focus on the main idea.
Every eviction process involves only one root-to-leaf path, which we call eviction path, on the
storage tree at server S0. The eviction path is selected in the reverse-lexicographic order, as

























Figure 6.2 Reverse-lexicographic Order: Every eviction process involves one root-to-leaf
eviction path selected in the reverse-lexicographic order.
An eviction process runs iteratively, one iteration for each node on the eviction path from the
root to the leaf. We introduce variable N ′e to denote the node currently involved in the eviction.
Hence, N ′e is initialized to N0,0 (i.e., the root node). Also, when an eviction iteration begins, S0
has an ordered list (denoted as ~L0) containing Z0 or Z1 blocks stored at node N ′e, depending on
whether N ′e is leaf or not; S1 has an ordered list (denoted as ~L1) of q blocks; S2 has no data blocks.
Then, the iteration, which involves the client and all the servers, runs as follows.
1. For each block ~Di ∈ ~L0 ∪ ~L1, where i represents the ID of the block, the client randomly









k′i,0|k′i,1|k′i,2. Also, from the current version of key ki recorded in the index table, the client
derives the current set of keys ki,0, ki,1 and ki,2 where PRG0(ki) = ki,0|ki,1|ki,2.
2. The client randomly constructs a permutation vector π0 for | ~L0| elements (i.e., a random
permutation of numbers 0, · · · , | ~L0| − 1) where | ~L0| denotes the length of ~L0, and sends the
vector to S0.
3. Upon receiving π0, S0 permutes ~L0 to ~L′0 = π0( ~L0), and sends ~L′0 to S1.
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4. Letting ~L′0| ~L1 = 〈 ~Di0 , · · · , ~Dix−1〉 where x = | ~L′0| + | ~L1|, the client randomly constructs a
permutation vector π1 for x elements and the following ordered list (denoted as ~R1):
~R1 = 〈(ki0,0, k′i0,1), · · · , (kix−1,0, k
′
ix−1,1)〉. (6.3)
Then, the client sends π1 and ~R1 to S1.
5. Upon receiving ~L′0 from S0 as well as π1 and ~R1 from the client, S1 first constructs ~L′1 =
~L′0| ~L1, which we also denote as 〈 ~Di0 , · · · , ~Dix−1〉. Next, it re-encrypts each block ~Dij (where
j = 0, · · · , x− 1), based on key pair (kij ,0, k′ij ,1) in ~R1, through the following steps:




• It updates ~Dij to ~D′ij = ~Dij ⊕ ~Rij ,0 ⊕ ~R
′
ij ,1
, where ⊕ is the bit-wise XOR between two
blocks (i.e., bit sequences).
Then, list 〈 ~D′i0 , · · · , ~D
′
ix−1
〉 is permuted according to π1, and the resulting list (denoted as
~L2) is sent to server S2.
6. Letting 〈i′0, · · · , i′x−1〉 be the ordered list of IDs of the blocks in ~L2, the client sends to S2 the
following list of key pairs
~R2 = 〈(ki′0,1, k
′
i′0,2




The client also constructs a permutation π2 for x elements, and sends π2 to S2.
7. Upon receiving π2 and ~R2 from the client, as well as ~L2 = 〈 ~Di′0 , · · · ,
~Di′x−1〉 from S1, server
S2 first re-encrypts each block in ~L2 based on the key pairs in ~R2, and then permutes the
re-encrypted list according to π2, as server S1 does. The resulting list (denoted as ~L′2 is sent
to server S0.
8. Letting 〈i′′0, · · · , i′′x−1〉 be the ordered list of IDs of the blocks in ~L′2, the client sends to S0 the
following list of key pairs
~R0 = 〈(ki′′0 ,2, k
′
i′′0 ,0





Besides, the client further constructs and sends to S0 an ordered list I with q elements, which
is a sub-stream of 〈0, · · · , x− 1〉. The construction should meet the following requirements:
• Case I: N ′e is a non-leaf node. For each j ∈ {0, · · · , x− 1}, if ~Di′′j is a real block and it
cannot be evicted to the next evicting node (i.e., the path that ~Di′′j is assigned to does
not pass the next evicting node), then j must not be in I.
• Case II: N ′e is a leaf node. I should contain only the IDs for dummy blocks.
9. Upon receiving L′2 from S2 as well as ~R0 and I from the client, server S0 re-encrypts each
block in L′2 based on the key pairs in ~R0, as S1 and S2 do. Then, from the resulting list of
blocks, S0 removes the list of blocks with offsets specified in I; these removed blocks are sent
to server S1 and become the new version of ~L1 if N ′e is a non-leaf node, or discarded if N ′e is
a leaf node.
























































Figure 6.3 A High-level Illustration of Eviction Process.
6.5 Accountability Enhancements
In this section, we propose several accountability enhancements to the above data query and
eviction algorithms, so that if a server maliciously changes a block, another server is able to detect.
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The enhancements affect the storage organization, system initialization, data query algorithm and
data eviction algorithm, in the following ways.
6.5.1 Enhancements to Storage and System Initialization
When the system is initialized, for each server Si where i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the client randomly
constructs λ blocks each with z bits, denoted as ~Ai,j = 〈ai,j,0, · · · , ai,j,z−1〉 for j ∈ {0, · · · , λ − 1},
where each ai,j,y ∈ {0, 1} for y ∈ {0, · · · , z − 1}. Then, the client sends each ~Ai,j to server Si, and
the block should be kept secret only between server Si and the client.
For each exported data block ~D, letting 〈d0, · · · , dz−1〉 denote its plain text, the client computes
3 message authentication codes (MACs) as follows.
• First, the client computes the following 3λ message authentication bits (MABs) for ~D:
MABi,j( ~D) = ⊕y∈{0,··· ,z−1}dy · ai,j,y, (6.6)
where i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ∈ {0, · · · , λ− 1}.
• Based on the MABs, the client computes the following 3 MACs for ~D:
MACi( ~D) = MABi,0| · · · |MABi,λ−1, (6.7)
where i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and | denotes concatenation.
Finally, the client stores MAC0( ~D), MAC1( ~D) and MAC2( ~D) to the entry of ~D in the index
table.
6.5.2 Enhancement to Data Query Algorithm
In the data query algorithm, we introduce an accountability enhancement to allow S1 to check
if S0 has sent to it a correct sequence ~L. The detail is as follows.
During the query process, the client completely knows which blocks should be in ~L. Let ~I =
〈i0, i1, · · · 〉 denote the IDs of the blocks in the sequence. For each block with ID ix ∈ ~I, the client
computes an MAC of the block that can be checked by the S1 as follows:
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• From the index table, it retrieves MAC1( ~Dix) (i.e., the MAC computed based on the block’s
plain text and the secret block ~A1 known by S1) and the current version of encryption key
kix for the block.
• It computes the two pseudo-random blocks that have been used to encrypt the block, i.e.,
~Rix,0 = PRG1(kix,0), ~Rix,1 = PRG1(kix,1), and ~Rix,2 = PRG1(kix,2). Note that, the x-th
block received by S1 should be equal to ~Dix ⊕ ~Rix,0 ⊕ ~Rix,1 ⊕ ~Rix,2 if it is correct.
• It computes MAC ′1( ~Dix) as
MAC1( ~Dix )⊕MAC1(~Rix,0)⊕MAC1(~Rix,0)⊕MAC1(~Rix,0), (6.8)
which should be equal to
MAC1( ~Dix ⊕ ~Rix,0 ⊕ ~Rix,1 ⊕ ~Rix,2) (6.9)
according to the definition of MAC1(·).
Then, MAC ′1(
~Dix) is sent to S1 for checking.
Upon receiving ~L from S0 and the ordered list of MACs from the client, S1 applies MAC1(·) to
compute the MAC for each block in ~L, and compares the resulting MAC with the MAC sent from
the client. If a mismatch is found, S0 will be identified to have modified some block.
6.5.3 Enhancements to Data Eviction Algorithm
The accountability enhancements to data eviction algorithm are similar to that applied for data
query algorithm. That is, whenever a server Si (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}) receives a list of blocks from another
server, Si needs to: (1) receive from the client an MACi for each block on the list; (2) re-computes
the MACi for each block on the list; (3) find out if the above values match.
6.6 Security Analysis
According to the definition of security in Chapter 2, we first study the security of the proposed




In this subsection, we show the obliviousness of the query and eviction processes; i.e., these
processes are random and independent of the client’s data access pattern. First of all, it is obvious
that the interactions between servers and the client follow the same pattern, independent of the
client’s access pattern. Hence, we focus to analyze the obliviousness of the processes inside server
S0.
6.6.1.1 Obliviousness in Query Path Selection
When the system is initialized, the path assigned to each block is selected randomly and in-
dependently of each other. After a block has been queried, its path is re-assigned randomly and
independently of the client’s data access pattern. Due to the randomness in path assignment, the
query path for each query process, which is determined by the path assigned to the query target
block, is random and independent of the client’s access pattern.
6.6.1.2 Obliviousness in Block Access from Query Path
According to the data query algorithm, the following block access pattern has been enforced:
from each node on the query path, the client must select one block that has not been accessed;
meanwhile, every block that has already been accessed has the same probability to be accessed
again according to Lemma 14.
6.6.1.3 Obliviousness in eviction process
The eviction process is random and independent of the client’s data access pattern, due to
the following reasons: (i) Each eviction process involves only one root-to-leaf path (called eviction
path), and the order in which the paths are selected for as eviction paths is fixed and independent of
data access pattern. (ii)During each eviction process, the processing for each node on the selected
eviction path follows a fixed pattern which is independent of data access pattern. Specifically, all
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the data blocks on the node are re-encrypted and re-permuted by all the servers; then, the same
number of blocks are stored back to the node.
6.6.2 Failure Analysis
In this subsection, we study the probabilities for a query process and an eviction process to fail.
6.6.2.1 Failure Probability for A Query Process




a block (in Line 6) becomes greater than 1. Also, as discussed in Section 6.3, we aim to make
δi,1+δi,2
δi,0
≤ 1 (which obviously makes δi,2
δ2i,0
≤ 1) such that on average no more than 2 blocks are




> 1, which is no less than the probability for a query process to fail. Our
result is stated in the following Lemma 15.
Lemma 15. As long as q ≥ 25λ and α ≥ 0.25 ∧ β ≥ 0.25 when m = 2, 4, Pr[ δi,1+δi,2δi,0 ≤ 1] > 1−2
−λ,
i.e., any query process fails with a probability less than 2−λ.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary node Ni on a m-ary storage tree, and let random variable X denote
the times that Ni has been selected to be on a query path during two consecutive evictions involving
the node. Obviously, X ≥ δi,1 + δi,2.
When m = 2, 4, according to the storage organization, the size of each node N ′i on the storage
tree is at least 2q ·min(1 + α, 1 + β) ≥ 2.5q; i.e., δi,0 + δi,1 + δi,2 ≥ 2.5q. Since an eviction process
is launched every q queries, the mean of X is q. Further according to the multiplicative Chernoff
bound,
Pr[X ≤ 1.25q] > 1− ( e
0.25
1.251.25
)q > 1− 2−2λ. (6.10)
Hence,
Pr[δi,1 + δi,2 < δi,0] ≥ Pr[δi,1 + δi,2 ≤ 1.25q] > 1− 2−λ. (6.11)
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When m ≥ 8, the size of each node on the storage tree is at least m−12 · q ≥ 3.5q; i.e., δi,0 +
δi,1 + δi,2 ≥ 2.5q. Due to Equation (6.10),
Pr[δi,1 + δi,2 < δi,0] > Pr[δi,1 + δi,2 ≤ 1.25q] > 1− 2−λ. (6.12)
6.6.2.2 Failure Probability for An Eviction Process
An eviction process fails iff the following scenarios occur in Step 8) of the eviction algorithm.
(i) Failure Scenario I: The current evicting node (i.e., N ′e) is a non-leaf node, and so q out of the x
blocks in L′2 need to be picked to send from S0 to S1. According to Case-I of the requirement, the
q blocks should not contain any real block that cannot be evicted to the next evicting node, but
failure will occur if there are more than x−q real blocks that cannot be evicted to the next evicting
node. (ii) Failure Scenario II: The current evicting node N ′e is a leaf node, and so q dummy blocks
out of the x blocks in L′2 need to be discarded. Failure will occur if there are less than q dummy
blocks (i.e., more than x− q real blocks) in L′2.
The results of our analysis are summarized as the following Lemmas 16 and 17. The proofs,
which have to be skipped due to space limit, can be developed based on the analysis of the eviction
process and the application of the multiplicative Chernoff bound.
Lemma 16. With q ≥ 25λ and the following combinations of system parameters, i.e., (m = 2, α ≥
0.25), (m = 4, α ≥ 0.25), (m = 8, α ≥ 0.34) and (m = 16, α ≥ 0.34), the Failure Scenario I occurs
with a probability of O(2−λ).
Lemma 17. With q ≥ 25λ and the following combinations of system parameters, i.e., (m = 2, β ≥
0.25), (m = 4, β ≥ 0.25), (m = 8, β ≥ 0.13) and (m = 16, β ≥ 0.09), the Failure Scenario II occurs
with a probability of O(2−λ).
Based on the above analysis on obliviousness and failure probablities, we get the following
theorem.
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Theorem 7. The proposed system is secure under the security definition in Chapter 2 with q ≥ 25λ
and the following combinations of system parameters: (m = 2, α ≥ 0.25, β ≥ 0.25), (m = 4, α ≥
0.25, β ≥ 0.25), (m = 8, α ≥ 0.34, β ≥ 0.13) and (m = 16, α ≥ 0.34, β ≥ 0.09).
6.6.3 Accountability Analysis
The accountability of the proposed system relies on the security of the proposed MAC mecha-
nism, which is formally stated and proved in the following.
Lemma 18. For ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and distinct blocks ~D and ~D′,




, u = 0, · · · , λ− 1. (6.13)
Proof. (By induction). Let ~D and ~D′ differ by n bits on indices v0, · · · , vn−1; let j ∈ {0, 1, 2},
u ∈ {0, · · · , λ − 1} and v ∈ {0, · · · , z − 1}; let ~Aj,u[v] denote the v-th bit on ~Aj,u (recall that ~Aj,u
is a secret block shared only between the client and server Sj).
When n = 1, MABj,u( ~D) = MABj,u( ~D
′) iff ~Aj,u[v0] = 0. Because ~Aj,u is randomly picked
from {0, 1}z, Pr[ ~Aj,u[v0] = 0] = 12 . Hence, Equation (6.13) holds.
Assuming Equation (6.13) holds when ~D and ~D′ differ by n ≤ t, we next prove the equation
holds when n = t + 1. Without loss of generality, assume ~D[vt] = 0 and ~D
′[vt] = 1. Let ~I0
be the z-bit block with 0 on every bit, ~I1 be the z-bit block with 1 on bit vt but 0 on all other
bits, and ~D′′ = ~D′ ⊕ ~I1 (i.e., ~D′ = ~D′′ ⊕ ~I1). Hence, ~D and ~D′′ differ in t bits v0, · · · , vt−1.
According to the induction assumption, Pr[MABj,u( ~D) = MABj,u( ~D
′′)] = 12 . Also note that,
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Pr[MABj,u(~I0) = MABj,u(~I1)] =
1
2 and
~D = ~D ⊕ ~I0, ~D′ = ~D′′ ⊕ ~I1. Therefore, we have
Pr[MABj,u( ~D) = MABj,u( ~D
′)] (6.14)
= Pr[MABj,u( ~D ⊕ ~I0) = MABj,u( ~D′′ ⊕ ~I1)] (6.15)
= Pr[MABj,u( ~D) = MABj,u( ~D
′′)]×
Pr[MABj,u(~I0) = MABj,u(~I1)] +
Pr[MABj,u( ~D) 6= MABj,u( ~D′′)]×















Theorem 8. If server Si sends data block ~D′ instead of ~D to server Sj, where i 6= j and ~D 6= ~D′,
then:
Pr[MACj( ~D
′) = MACj( ~D)] = 2
−λ; (6.18)
i.e., the misbehavior of Si is detected with a probability of 1− 2−λ.
Proof. According to the MAC definition in Section 6.5 and Lemma 18,
Pr[MACj( ~D





′) = MABj,u( ~D)] = 2
−λ. (6.20)
6.7 Performance Evaluation and Comparisons
We have implemented the proposed system, and conducted performance comparisons with




We rent four AWS EC2 instances to run our implemented servers and client. As the com-
munication latency between these instances are smaller than those between client and server and
between the servers owned by different cloud owners, we conducted experiments to measure the
communication latencies between AWS EC2 and Microsoft Compute Engine instances and add
the measured average round trip delay 29 ms to the communication between our servers; we also
measured the communication latencies between these cloud servers and a rented client located at
the center of North America Continent, and add the measured average round trip delay 177.5 ms
to the communication between our servers and client.
We set security parameter λ = 40, which makes the failure probability of each query and eviction
process to be lower than 2−40. According to Theorem 7, we set q = 1024 which is greater than 25λ;
with different m, we adopt the following combinations of system parameter by default: (m = 2, α =
β = 0.25), (m = 4, α = β = 0.25), (m = 8, α = 0.34, β = 0.13) and (m = 16, α = 0.34, β = 0.09).
In each evaluation, we vary N (i.e., the number of real data blocks to export) between 220 to
226 and vary B (i.e., the size of each data block in bytes) between 16K to 1M .
We measure the following metrics: (1) client-server communication cost, which is measured as
the average number of blocks sent between the client and the servers to serve each data query
request; (2) inter-server communication cost, which is measured as the average number of blocks
sent among the servers per data query; (3) query delay, which is measured as the average time
elapse from a query request is sent from the client till the requested data block arrives at the client;
(4) server storage overhead, which is measured as the amount of storage consumed at the server
other than that for storing N exported data blocks; and (5) client storage cost, which is measured
as the amount of storage consumed at the client.
To optimize the system parameter selection, we also measure the system costs with varying m
and results are shown in Table 6.1. Note that, the table only shows the results when N = 220,
as the trend is similar with different N . As we can see from the table, when m increases, the
client-server communication cost does not change; the inter-server communication cost decreases
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and then increases; the server storage overhead decreases. Hence, in the following experiments, we
set m = 8 to make our system to have low communication and storage overheads.
6.7.2 Comparison with S3ORAM
6.7.2.1 Communication Costs and Query Delay
As shown in Fig 6.4, our ORAM system incurs smaller inter-server communication cost, which
is about 60-80% of that of S3ORAM. Both schemes require a constant number of blocks to be trans-
ferred between the client and server for each query. Specifically, in our system, the communication
cost ranges from 1 to 1.3 data blocks per query, which includes 1 target block downloaded from S1
and some control messages for query and eviction. S3ORAM needs to download 3 data blocks as
well as a small size of meta-data.
In terms of query delay, as shown in Fig 6.5, our ORAM has similar but a slightly higher query
delay. This is due to the fact that, the request data block needs to travel through the path of
S0 → S1 → client; the detour between the servers incurs some extra delay, but it is very small
compared to the delay between client and server.
6.7.2.2 Storage Overheads
Both schemes require 3 non-colluding servers. For S3ORAM, all servers have the same structure,
different in that each server stores a different secret-shared version of blocks. Our system stores
data blocks on one server, i.e., S0, while the other two servers only need to allocate small storage
to facilitate query and eviction. Fig 6.6 shows the server-side storage overheads. Specifically, the
Table 6.1 System Costs with Varying m
m Client-Server Comm. Cost Inter-Server Comm. Cost Server Storage Overhead
2 1.3B 96B 1.5 N
4 1.3B 58B 1.1 N
8 1.3B 67B 0.3N











































































































































































(c) B = 256KB (d) B = 1MB
Figure 6.4 Inter-Server Communication Cost.
server-side storage overhead of S3ORAM is 11N data blocks, while the overhead of our system is
(β + 1+α7 )N +
(1+α)s
2 , which is no more than 0.3N blocks.
As the cost of the increased server storage efficiency, our system requires a larger client-side
storage space, which is around 0.1% of the server-side storage cost.
Also node that, both schemes require some computation at the server side. S3ORAM requires
its servers to execute addition and multiplication of Shamir Secret Sharing operations, while our
ORAM requires server to run random number generator to produce pseudo random sequences and
then perform XOR operations to decrypt or re-encrypt data blocks. Our ORAM also requires the
server to conduct authentication, which is also XOR operations. Our evaluations show that, the



































































































































(c) B = 256KB (d) B = 1MB
Figure 6.5 Query Delay
6.7.2.3 Summary
Compared to S3ORAM, our ORAM achieves a same level of efficiency in client-server commu-
nication, a higher level of efficiency in server-server communication, and a significantly higher level
of server-side storage efficiency, at the price of increased client-side storage requirement, which
however is affordable for a client who maintains an on-premise facility such as a cloud storage
gateway.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a new oblivious cloud storage system to address the limitations































































































































































(c) B = 256KB (d) B = 1MB
Figure 6.6 Server Storage Overhead
can simultaneously attain the features of provable protection of data access pattern, low data query
delay, low server storage overhead; low communication costs, and accountability.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this dissertation, we have presented three novel Oblivious RAM solutions to improve the state-
of-the-art Oblivious RAM performance. We have rigorously proved their security and demonstrated
their asymptotical efficiency. We have also shown their practical performances through numerical
analysis. The main contributions of our work are:
First, we propose SE-ORAM: A Storage-Efficient Oblivious RAM. SE-ORAM is an ORAM
construction with zero storage overhead at the server, while communication efficiency is similar or
higher than state-of-the-art. SE-ORAM stores exactly N number of data blocks on server side,
which has zero server storage overhead. Note that, the server stores a small number of dummy
blocks, and the real block replaced by dummy block is stored in user side storage. The number of
introduced dummy blocks is no more than x logN with probability 1− 1
N2x
, as long as λ ≥ 2 and each
node on the storage tree can store 4 logN or more data blocks. SE-ORAM incurs communication
cost of O(log2N ·B) where B is block size in unit of bits, which is higher than some state-of-the-art
ORAM constructions.
Second, we propose Octopus ORAM: A Storage Efficient 8-ary Tree ORAM. Octopus ORAM
aims at reducing the client-server communication cost in the cost of introducing a small amount of
server storage overhead, which is much lower than existing ORAM constructions. Octopus ORAM
can significantly reduce the server storage overhead to around 0.34N (i.e., the server only needs to
allocate 1.34N blocks when the client outsources N blocks) while maintaining a comparable level
of communication cost: to server a query, the online communication cost is 3 blocks and eviction
(maintenance) communication cost is no more than 1.5 logN blocks.
Third, we propose Three Servers ORAM: An efficient and Accountable k-ary Tree Storage Ef-
ficient ORAM. The new three servers ORAM incurs low server storage overhead, which is around
0.3N blocks for every N real data blocks exported, the client-server communication cost is O(B)
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bits per query by average, and server-server communication cost is O(logN ·B), lower communica-
tion costs than S3ORAM, the most related state-of-the-art scheme. By supporting accountability
with multiple servers, the work removes the less-realistic semi-honest assumption in a multi-server
oblivious storage system.
For the future work, there are multiple directions to work on. First of all, we would like to
improve the performance of the system by further reducing the communication costs, especially the
inter-server communication costs. Secondly, we plan to polish the implementation and eventually
make the system more robust to deploy. We also plan to improve ORAM efficiency when the server
is configured with trusted platform model (TPM). When the server has TPM enforcement, we will
be able to migrate some computation work to server and then with re-designed algorithms, we can
make ORAM more efficient.
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